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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OUTLINE 
This paper discusses aspects of the conduct of monetary policy in Uganda. The starting 
point being the perception held by some that while Uganda has been amongst the most 
consistently successful countries in Africa in controlling inflation since the early 1990s, 
this has come at a high fiscal cost and that the conduct of monetary policy has stifled 
rather than encouraged the development of the financial sector. 
 
Recently, these concerns have been compounded by a growing feeling that the monetary 
regime that has for so long served Uganda well but the reserve money framework is 
proving less successful in delivering low and stable inflation as the capital account has 
become more open. 
 
It can be argued that while some aspects of this critique are valid, they need to be put in 
context.  Depending on the counterfactual used, the cost of conducting monetary policy 
in Uganda may be relatively high and certainly at times in the recent past it has probably 
been inefficiently so.  But to a significant degree these high costs reflect the structural 
characteristics of the Ugandan economy.  The small size of the economy and its asset 
markets,  is  historical  legacy,  including  near-hyper  inflation  and  an  almost  complete 
demonetization  in the  late 1980s, and the  nature of the external shocks to which the 
economy is exposed, places particular pressures on the monetary authorities and entails 
generally higher interest rate and exchange rate volatility than might otherwise be the 
case. 
 
These features will take some time to unwind.  More can be achieved in the short-run in 
terms of reviewing the stance of policy, however.  There is little doubt that the conduct of 
monetary policy in response to the surge in aid and private capital flows around the turn 
of  the  century  probably  exacerbated  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  volatility,  to the 
detriment of the economy.  This, it is argued, can be traced to fundamental difficulties 
associated with operating a reserve money programme in the face of an open and volatile 
capital  account.    However,  recent  modifications  to  the  Bank  of  Uganda’s  operating 
procedures have very significantly improved the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
The strong current inflationary pressures are predominantly but not exclusively driven by 
supply side factors including the global surge in food and fuel prices.  Nonetheless, since 
these are likely to be reasonably persistent there may be a case for some tightening of the 
monetary stance to bring inflation back towards its target.  This may entail a slightly 
more appreciated exchange rate and/or higher domestic interest rates.  How tight this 
squeeze needs to be will depend on the Bank’s views about their persistence of the supply 
shocks, which in turn depend on how the current credit crisis in industrialized economies 
impacts on global aggregate demand, and its assessment about the speed and magnitude 
of the supply-side response to the ongoing investment boom in Uganda. 
 
Notwithstanding these recent developments, we take the view that while there is certainly 
scope for refinement and modification – for example more may still need to be done to 
establish a more flexible approach to policy on bond sterilization and there is a strong 
case  for  greater  coordination  between  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  
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Development and the Bank of Uganda on managing the quasi-fiscal costs of liquidity 
generation    --  there  is  no  strong  case  for  a  radical  re-orientation  of  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy in Uganda in the short run.  We also take the view that there is at best 
only a weak case for considering the taxation of private capital flows in the short run: 
significant investment in systems is still required before a credible regime could be put in 
place. 
 
In the medium term, however, it is likely that more radical modifications to the monetary 
framework will be called for.  Intellectual perspectives on the conduct of monetary policy 
in Africa are changing, with an increasing number of countries on the continent actively 
considering anchoring their monetary policy in explicit inflation targeting (IT) regimes, 
following the lead of South Africa and Ghana.  The debate on the merits of inflation 
targeting  has  started  to  emerge  in  official  circles  in  Uganda  and  has  featured  in 
discussions on monetary and fiscal policy harmonization in the East African Community. 
The intellectual case for inflation targeting is compelling and the experience of the first 
wave of IT countries – at least up to around 2007 – lends empirical support for a shift 
towards full-fledged inflation targeting. 
 
It does not follow, however, that IT can or should be implemented either quickly or in the 
same form as elsewhere.  The second part of this paper outlines the key characteristics of 
an inflation targeting regime and discusses a number of issues for consideration were 
Uganda to chose to move towards a formal inflation targeting regime.  Priority areas in 
this respect include: the extent to which  inflation targeting  needs to be buttressed by 
fiscal rules; how the authorities can reconcile legitimate competing objectives, especially 
over  the  exchange  rate,  with  a  credible  commitment  to  an  inflation  target;  and  what 
instruments  to  employ  in  pursuit  of  an  inflation  target  when  financial  markets  are 
relatively underdeveloped. 
 
The issues discussed here in the context of inflation targeting are no less relevant to the 
efficient functioning of the current monetary regime and as such they define a set of 
research priorities for the Bank of Uganda and for other agencies in the country.  Three 
areas as being of particular importance are seen.  The first concerns the transmission 
mechanism of  monetary policy  and  how this  is  likely to evolve as  financial  markets 
develop.  The second, which derives from the first, is the development of an operational 
model  for  forecasting  inflation  and,  as  a  by  product,  the  information  demands  this 
imposes  on  the  statistical  authorities  in  the  country.  The  final  area  concerns  the 
development of structures to communicate and  inform the public on  monetary policy 
choices.  
 
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections.  Section I reviews recent monetary 
conditions and addresses the issue of how the cost of monetary policy can be measured. 
Sections II and III represent the core of the paper and examine why the reserve money 
programme has become less effective over time as the capital account has become more 
open  and  how  this  weakness  might  be  addressed.    Section  IV  briefly  discusses  the 
question of the taxation of capital flows and Section V concludes with a discussion of the 





1.  RECENT MONETARY CONDITIONS AND THE COST OF MONETARY POLICY  
 
Uganda’s reputation  for sound  macroeconomic  management  is  founded on a credible 
commitment to low and stable  inflation.  Core inflation declined steadily  from 1992, 
dipped below 10 percent per annum in the first quarter of 1996, and until May 2008 
averaged less than 5 percent per annum.  Headline inflation has been somewhat more 
volatile but it too has been low and relatively stable over the same period.
1 Even allowing 
for the ‘great moderation’ in world inflation over this period, inflation in Uganda has 
been consistently lower than in virtually every African country outside the CFA zone and 
South Africa.  This impressive record has been anchored in a relentless adherence to a 
tight reserve money programme, heavily buttressed by the cash-budget fiscal rule.  In 
recent years, however, concerns have been raised about the continued efficacy of the 
reserve money programme.  On the one hand, it would appear that the programme may 
be becoming less successful at anchoring inflation and on the other, that its operation has 
led  to  high  domestic  interest  rates  and  has  stifled  both  the  lending  activities  of  the 
banking system and the development of an effective interest rate channel of monetary 
policy transmission. 
 
In Sections II and III of this paper we examine why the reserve money programme has 
encountered difficulties and examine how this framework might be modified.  In doing so 
we focus quite narrowly on the conduct of monetary policy itself and in particular on the 
question of the appropriate degree of exchange rate intervention (and sterilization) in the 
face of external shocks inducing shifts in the private sector’s asset demands.  Before 
turning to these policy issues we consider first the question of measuring the cost of 
monetary policy. 
 
The ‘cost’ of monetary policy 
 
Any  discussion  of  the  cost  of  monetary  policy  requires  a  clear  articulation  of  the 
counterfactual.  This is difficult to establish for a number of reasons.  A natural starting 
point would be to compare the performance of the current regime against other potential 
regimes for the country or, more commonly, against other countries. But these simple 
comparisons face problems. To evaluate actual and counterfactual behaviour we must 
have an idea of both the objective function of the authorities and the nature of the shocks 
to which the authorities must react.  Both are, however unobservable.  We may attempt to 
control for these factors by assuming that countries similar in other observable ways face 
similar shocks and have similar preferences: hence a regional comparison may be most 
appropriate.  This is where we start: later in Section II we rely more heavily on formal 
simulation models which make explicit both preferences and shocks. 
 
                                                 
1 Between 1996 and May 2008, core inflation averaged 4.4percent per annum with a standard deviation of 
2.2percent per month. Over the same period, headline inflation averaged 5.1percent with a monthly 
standard deviation of 4.1percent per month.     
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The  conventional  text-book  treatment  of  the  cost  of  monetary  policy  distinguishes 
between two related notions.  The first is the idea of the ‘sacrifice ratio’ which is defined 
as the cumulative loss of output, expressed as a percentage of current GDP, associated 
with a one percentage point reduction  in trend  inflation.  The sacrifice ratio emerges 
directly from the short-run Phillips curve.  Inverting the Phillips curve we obtain  
 
(1)     
*
1 ( ) ( ) t t t t t y y u α π π − − = − +  
 
where  y  denotes  output, 
*
t y   is  potential  output  and  t π   inflation.    The  parameter 
0 α > determines the size of the sacrifice ratio. The larger is α  the higher the output cost 
of disinflation.
2  The sacrifice ratio is either estimated from time-series VAR models or 
through detailed analysis of specific deflationary episodes. 
 
The concept of the sacrifice ratio really only makes sense in a stationary environment, 
however, in which output is close to its potential and inflation is driven principally by the 
authorities’ demand-side policy actions.  This does not describe Uganda in recent years.  
Over the decade or so from 1996, Uganda has followed what is better described as a 
‘post-stabilization’ path  in which, as a result of policy reforms, resource inflows and 
structural transformation, the economy  has seen a significant increase  in trend output 
which has gone hand in hand with a steady recovery in the demand for money.  At the 
same time, real import costs have fallen substantially as a result of the re-integration of 
China into the world economy, supporting the ‘great inflation moderation’ that continued 
through to the end of 2006.  As a result, trend and actual output and inflation in Uganda 
have been negatively correlated.  Using this standard approach, then, there has been no 
sacrifice, no trade-off between output growth and inflation. 
 
The second notion of the cost is a fiscal or quasi-fiscal one, namely: what are the resource 
costs of conducting an independent monetary policy?  In Uganda, this discussion has 
tended  to  focus  very  narrowly  on  the  size  of  domestic  interest  costs  charged  to  the 
government budget which, over the last decade domestic interest has risen sharply, from 
around 0.3 percent of GDP in the second half of the 1990s (or 3 percent of domestic 
revenue)  to  approximately  0.9  percent  of  GDP  in  2006/07  and  are  projected  to  be 




This sharp rise reflects both an increase in the debt stock and in real interest rates.  The 
outstanding gross stock of domestic debt has risen from 2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4 
percent of GDP  in 2000 and to almost 9 percent of GDP in 2005/06 (see Figure 1).  
Estimates for 2007/08 put the total debt stock at around 11 percent of GDP.
4    At the 
same time, high debt service costs also reflect high interest rates on debt (Figures 2 and 
3).  Nominal 91-day Treasury Bill rates have fallen, particularly since the early 2000s, 
                                                 
2 Some analyses of the sacrifice ratio allow for the estimated size of α to vary between increases in inflation 
and decreases; it is the latter than matters for the sacrifice ratio.  
3  Christensen (2004) and IMF (2008a, 2008b). 
4 IMF (2008b).  
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but  as  Figure  3  makes  clear  domestic  interest  rates  still  remain  substantially  above 
comparable  US  government  bill  rates,  more  so  once  exchange  rate  differentials  are 




Interest on public debt currently accounts for around 1 percent of GDP or around 10 
percent of government revenue before grants.  This is a broadly similar burden to that 
faced by neighbouring countries (in Tanzania the figures are almost identical, while in 
Kenya  interest costs are around 2 percent of GDP but domestic revenue is also higher, 
around  22  percent  of  GDP).    By  this  measure  of  the  counterfactual,  Uganda  is  not 
severely out of line with natural comparators.  This is an incomplete picture, however, 
since the gross debt stock is more than offset by government deposits with the banking 
system.  By the end of 2007, for example, the outstanding stock of domestic debt held by 
the  monetary  system  was  around  6.5  percent  of  GDP  but  government  deposits  with 
financial institutions stood at close to 9.6 percent of GDP (see Figure 1).  While fiscal 
projections anticipate government becoming a net debtor to the financial system in the 
next  few  years  the  essential  tension  remains:    government  is  concerned  that  despite 
running positive net fiscal balance (and indeed a large primary surplus net of aid), it is 
still paying almost 10 percent of its income in interest costs on public domestic debt.  
 
 
                                                 
5  The nominal differential in Figure 3 is calculated as 
d f
t t i i − where  and 
d f
t t i i  denotes the annual interest 
rate on Ugandan and US 3-month treasury bills.  The exchange rate adjusted differential is derived from the 
uncovered interest parity or no-arbitrage condition 
d f
t t t t i i E e = + &  which states that for an equivalent asset 
risk and maturity, domestic interest rates will equal foreign rates adjusted for the expected depreciation of 
the exchange rate over the holding period. The exchange rate adjusted differential is therefore 
d f
t t t t i i E e − − & .  Hence if asset holders expect the exchange rate to appreciate they should be prepared to 
accept a lower domestic interest so that the differential increases.   
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Macroeconomic management is the responsibility of the public sector.  It therefore makes 
sense to start with the budget constraints of the government and the central bank.  We shall 
consider two alternative cases, the first where the only interest bearing securities are the 
liabilities of government (even though decisions over their management is vested in the 
central bank) and the second where the central bank issues its own liabilities (backed 
implicitly by its capital). 
 
In the former case, the government’s budget constraint is defined 
 
(2)    1 1
G f G G
T t t t t t t t t t t t t t G i B E i F T S DC B E F E A − − + + − − = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + . 
 
Total government expenditure is the sum of non-interest expenditure, G, and interest 
payments on domestic and foreign debt, ( 1 1  and 
f
t t t t t i B E i F − −  respectively, where E is the 
nominal exchange rate). Total domestic revenues are defined as the sum of conventional 
revenues (T) plus any transfer out of profits from the central bank (denoted S).  The 
difference is covered by a combination of domestic financing, foreign financing and 
grants.  Domestic financing is defined as the sum of domestic credit from the central bank 
plus borrowing from the banking system.  For PRGF countries such as Uganda, virtually 
all foreign financing is on concessional terms so for convenience we can define 
1 ( )
f
t t t t t t t t A E F E A Ei F − = ∆ + − % as net foreign financing of the budget, allowing us to re-
write the government budget constraint in terms of its domestic financing consequences as  
 
(3)  1 ( )
G G
t t t T t t t t t DF DC B G i B T S A − = ∆ +∆ = + − − − % . 
 
The domestic financing requirement is equal to the fiscal deficit inclusive of domestic 
interest costs less net foreign financing and the profit remittances from the central bank.  
Domestic financing consists of 
G
t DC ∆  , the net increase in central bank claims on the 
government and 
G
t B ∆  the net claims of deposit money banks and other entities. 
 
The central bank’s own budget constraint states that any net acquisition of domestic assets 
or international reserves must be financed either by its own net income or by an expansion 
in the monetary base, H less profits remitted to government. 
 
(4)  t t t t NDA NIR H S ∆ +∆ = ∆ −  
 
We have assumed for simplicity that the central bank transfers its entire net profits, S, to 
the government.  The central bank’s net profit is measured in cash-flow terms and consists 
of its net operating income which, in turn, consists of gross income, principally interest 


















































[Box 1 continued] 
 
 
In terms of the underlying assets we need to distinguish between the accumulation of 
foreign assets and valuation changes arising from movements in the exchange rate since 
only the former constitutes the asset counterpart to monetary base.  Thus letting 




t t t t t t H DC E z S NW ∆ = ∆ + ∆ − −∆   
 
where  t NW ∆  the change in the net worth of the central bank arising from exchange rate 
revaluation of net foreign assets.
[*]  
 
While the monetization of fiscal deficits – the 
G
t DC ∆  term – constitutes the main link 
between fiscal and monetary policy, equations (2) and (5) bring out the central bank’s own 
financial position, summarized by its net profit which is transferred to government. 
 
Clearly, this transfer washes out when we consolidate the government with the central 
bank. Combining (2) and (5), and letting  ( ) t t t Pdef G T = −  be the primary budget deficit 





t t t t t t t t t H B E z Pdef i B A NW − ∆ +∆ − ∆ = + − −∆ %   
 
Ignoring the final net worth term, this states that the overall fiscal deficit net of aid 
regardless of on which institution’s budget  interest costs appear  is ultimately financed 
through some combination of seigniorage (defined here as growth in the monetary base), 
growth in domestic public sector debt, and depletion of international reserves 
 
[*]  Revaluation effects represent unrealized capital gains or losses. In contrast to realized exchange 
rate gains or losses that would arise, for example, if the Bank purchased foreign exchange at the 
market rate and sold it to preferred customers at a below-market rate, unrealized capital gains and 
losses do not have an immediate budgetary impact.  However, to the extent that cumulative 
exchange rate revaluation losses represent a de-capitalization of the central bank., there will 








































High interest costs: structure, policy choices and policy co-ordination.  
 
The persistence of high interest rates in Uganda can be explained by at least two sets of 
factors:  the  structural  characteristics  of  underdeveloped  financial  markets  that  both 
underpin  substantial  premia  in  asset  prices  and  also  sustain  the  monopoly  power  of 
established commercial banks; and choices by the central bank over the deployment of 




Asset markets in Uganda are small, both in absolute terms and relative to the economy as 
a whole, and trade is thin. Honohan and Beck (2007) report that while the mean M3/GDP 
ratio for Africa in 2004-05 was 32 percent, that for Uganda was only 19 percent.  The 
averages for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole are low.  The corresponding figure for South 
Asia is 50 percent of GDP while that for industrialized economies typically exceeds 100 
percent.  Not only  is the  financial sector small  it  is poorly diversified: the economic 
fortunes of both depositors and borrowers are highly correlated, leaving limited scope for 
banks to hedge their asset books.  With the addition of weak legal structures for dispute 
settlement and a relatively underdeveloped capacity of markets to value assets and risk, 
this means that asset prices in Uganda embody a substantial liquidity premium. 
 
In addition, the  banking sector itself  is  highly concentrated – the three  largest banks 
account for approximately 70 percent of the total financial assets under management.  
Combined with the illiquidity in the market, this high concentration sustains wide net 
interest margins and relatively low lending to the private sector.  The net interest margin 
in Uganda averaged around 1400 basis points in 2004-05, which was substantially larger 
than in other African countries (where the average is around 800 basis points) and the rest 
of  the  world,  where  the  margin  was  around  400  basis  points.
6    As  a  consequence, 
Ugandan banks have done relatively little intermediation: credit extended to the private 
sector by the banking system is remarkably low at around 11 percent of GDP, compared 
to an African average of around 20 percent (and an average for all developing countries 
of around 30 percent).
7   
 
Although these indicators suggest a highly monopolistic and rather dysfunctional banking 
system, changes in recent years which have included liberalization in the banking sector 
and the emergence of new South African banks in Uganda, suggest reform measures are 
gaining some traction.  Though still low, lending has increased very substantially, rising 
from a meagre 1.5 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to its current level of around 11 
percent. (The current average for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is 36 percent and around 
20 percent for low-income SSA countries)
8 .  At the same time broader indicators of 
financial  innovation,  access  and  competition  have  moved  in  a  positive  direction  (see 
Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
 
These movements are obviously welcome but structures change slowly.  But the overall 
level of domestic interest rates may also reflect the operation of monetary policy.  In 
circumstances where domestic interest rates are not firmly tied to world rates, a tight 
monetary stance will drive domestic rates above their long-run (structural) values and 
possibly for extended periods of time.  The prima facie evidence from Figure 3 suggests 
this has happened on a number of occasions in recent years in Uganda.
9  High interest 
rates  could,  of  course,  represent  the  optimal  response  to  various  shocks,  but  as  the 
                                                 
6 Honohan and Beck (2007). 
7 Ibid. and IMF Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (April 2009). 
8  IMF Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (April 2009). 
9 In the case where cross-border capital flows tie domestic interest rates closely to world rates, a tight 
monetary policy will be reflected in rising debt volumes.  
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analysis in Sections II and III suggests, these deviations can more readily be explained 
directly in terms of policy choices emerging from the inflexible adherence to the reserve 
money programme. 
 
The consolidated accounts of the public sector 
 
Policy choices may also affect interest rates through an alternative channel if, for a given 
planned  monetary  stance,  the  monetary  authorities  deploy  an  inefficient  mix  of 
instruments.    One  potential  source  of  inefficiency  is  if  there  are  conflicts  of  interest 
between the central bank and government over the allocation of the quasi-fiscal costs and 
revenues arising from the conduct of an independent monetary policy.
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Cast  in  this  light,  domestic  interest  costs  are  only  a  partial  measure  of  the  ‘cost  of 
monetary  policy’,  however.    They  measure  only  one  element  in  the  net  monetary 
transactions  -- i.e. those costs that appear on the government budget.  But price stability 
is a public good and hence the correct way to measure the cost of supplying this public 
good, through monetary policy, is from the perspective of the consolidated accounts of 
the public sector, in other words the accounts of the central bank and government taken 
together. 
 
How large are these costs?  
 
In most industrialized countries central banks typically carry out their tightly prescribed 
(monetary policy) tasks at relatively low net cost, at least in 'normal times'.
11  Central 
banks  are  comparatively  small  institutions  capable  of  financing  their  operations, 
including the cost of conducting monetary policy, through seigniorage revenue plus other 
means  (for  example,  they  can  earn  income  by  making  better-than-market  spreads  on 
taking  reserve  deposits  at  just  below  market  rates  and  making  placements  at  market 
rates). 
 
Given their tendency to engage in a wider range of quasi-fiscal activities, central banks in 
developing  countries,  however,  have  tended  to  either  make  very  large  profits  for 
government (for example through the operation of dual exchange rate regimes of the type 
operated in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa during the 1980s) or accumulate large quasi-
fiscal losses, as in Zimbabwe where the central bank’s quasi-fiscal losses in 2006 were 
estimated to be equivalent to 75 percent of GDP (Munoz, 2007).  
                                                 
10 The quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank are those activities that can, in principle, be duplicated 
by direct budgetary measures in the form of an explicit tax, subsidy or direct expenditure and that has or 
may have an impact on the financial operations of the central bank or government (Mackenzie and Stella, 
1996).  This  definition  includes  both  the  egregious  quasi-fiscal activities  (subsidized  credit to  favoured 
sectors, preferential exchange rates, forward cover at non-market rates etc) but also the ‘regular’ operations 
such as sterilization and other open market operations using public sector liabilities. 
11  In this discussion, and despite being widely used in OECD economies at the present time, I ignore the 
exceptional costs of addressing  liquidity and solvency crises  through bail-outs or other major liquidity 






Table 1: The cost of monetary policy 
 
  Percent of GDP 
2006/07  2007/08 
Bank of Uganda     
Net Operating Income [1]  0.65  0.90 
      o/w  Gross interest income on official reserves [2]  0.55  0.78 
     
Government of Uganda     
Direct budgetary costs [interest paid on domestic debt]  0.88  1.20 
     
Gross (cost) /Revenue of monetary policy excl. 
seigniorage 
 
(0.23)  (0.30) 
Seigniorage revenue [3]  1.02  1.02 
     
Net (cost) revenue of monetary policy  0.79  0.72 
     
BoU dividend to government  -  0.16 
 
Source: IMF (2008a); Bank of Uganda Annual Report 2007/08. 
Notes:  [1] Excludes unrealized capital gains / losses on revaluation of foreign exchange reserves.  In 
2006/07 these were equivalent to a loss of 1.26percent of GDP in 2006/07 and a gain of 0.41 percent in 
2007/08. [2] Gross income is dominated by interest income on foreign exchange reserves. [3] The real 
value of seigniorage is defined as  1 (1 )(1 )









  + +
∆ +   + +  
where m denotes real reserve money, g 
the growth in GDP and  t π is the rate of inflation.  The first term denotes the growth in real demand for base 
money and the second, ‘inflation tax’. We assume this accrues to the Bank of Uganda 
 
The picture for contemporary Uganda highlights the tension between the central bank and 
government.  As Table 1, based on data from the 2007/08 Annual Report of the Bank of 
Uganda,  suggests,  excluding  unrealized  capital  gains  or  losses  arising  from  the 
revaluation of net foreign assets, the net cost of conducting monetary operations to the 
consolidated  public  sector  is  around  0.23  percent  of  GDP,  remarkably  similar  to the 
industrialized economy benchmark.  Adding back the revenue from seigniorage, which is 
approximately 1 percent of GDP per annum, we find that from a simple net revenue 
perspective, the operation of an independent monetary policy generates a revenue flow to 
the consolidated budget of approximately 0.75 percent of GDP per annum, excluding 
capital gains or losses on revaluation.  
 
However, the disposition of this income is markedly different. While the Bank of Uganda 
made a small operating profit in 2006/07 and 2007/08, principally from foreign interest  
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income, the government incurred a substantial ‘loss’ in terms of interest costs borne by 
the budget. This imbalance is at the heart of tensions over the cost of monetary policy. 
 
 
Coordination and the financial strength of the central bank 
 
The presentation of the consolidated public sector budget constraint in Box 1 shows that, 
from the perspective of the public  sector as a whole, the distribution of the costs of 
conducting  monetary  policy  between  government  and  the  central  bank  should  be 
irrelevant  and  should  not  be  a  determining  factor  in  the  central  banks’  operational 
decisions. 
 
The  analysis  in  Box  1  also  shows  why  neutrality  may  not  prevail.    If  the  financial 
resources controlled by the central bank and /or government affect the instruments the 
bank can choose to deploy, or if they affect the leverage it brings to the policy process, 
then  the  disposition  of  resources  between  the  central  bank  and  government  is  not 
necessarily innocuous.  For example, consider a situation in which government seeks to 
retire a substantial portion of domestic credit outstanding. A side effect of this – if the 
central  bank  charges  interest  on  government’s  overdraft  --  is  to  reduce  central  bank 
interest income.  If it is concerned about its own bottom line, rather than that of the 
consolidated  public  sector,  the  central  bank  may  now  face  incentives  to  accumulate 
interest-earning international reserves (and at the same time use government securities to 
sterilize the consequent liquidity injection) at a significantly higher rate than would be 
indicated by monetary and exchange rate targets alone.  If, as is likely, domestic interest 
rates exceed those on foreign assets, the consolidated account suffers a loss, even though 
the transactions provide support to the income base of the central bank. 
 
A central banks’ function is to trade in domestic and foreign assets to achieve specified 
policy  goals  rather  than  to  maximize  revenues.    With  the  capacity  to  issue  domestic 
currency, it can continue to operate at a loss and, indeed, with negative net worth (i.e. 
accumulated losses) as long as the market continues to regard its liabilities as secure.  
With government standing behind it, central bank paper usually attracts the country’s 
sovereign rating.  However concerns about its own bottom line are relevant in order to 
ensure that de jure independence they may enjoy is reinforced by a degree of financial 
independence  from  government.    The  bank’s  policy  credibility  will  be  reinforced  if 
market participants believe it will act according to its mandate and not be constrained to 
follow the not necessarily coincident interests of government. 
 
During the 1970s and 80s central banks across Africa made substantial profits through 
large quasi-rents arising from financial repression and dual exchange rate regimes.  The 
processes  of  financial  and  exchange  rate  liberalization  since  the  early  1990s  has, 
however, squeezed these profits and fuelled tensions between them and governments over 
the allocation of the costs of conducting monetary policy.  Ironically, this squeeze on 
profits has been exacerbated in recent years by macroeconomic success which has seen a 
decline  in  governments’  domestic  borrowing  requirements,  lower  inflation  and  lower  
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seigniorage revenue.  It has been further aggravated by the decline in interest rates earned 
on foreign reserves, particularly dollar-denominated assets. 
 
So, if the financial independence of the central bank is a public good, its financing should 
presumably be undertaken by the whole public sector.  Ideally, the central bank would 
have sufficient financial strength to ensure that it can execute monetary policy under a 
range of conditions without resorting to measures inconsistent with its policy mandate 
(Stella, 2008). 
 
In Uganda, one option is clearly the status quo.  From the government’s perspective this 
may be unattractive for two reasons.  The first is that this may create the incentive for the 
Bank to lean more heavily on bond sterilization that would otherwise be the case.  The 
second  is that such a  mechanism  may weaken  incentives  for the Bank of Uganda to 
control  operating  expenses.  An  alternative  of  placing  a  limit  on  the  volume  of 
government  debt  the  central  bank  could  issue,  so  as  to  limit  the  recurrent  cost  to 
government is equally unattractive. 
 
By far the most attractive option would be for the central bank to issue its own interest 
bearing  liabilities  for the  purpose  of  conducting  monetary  policy.    This  would  entail 
treating interest costs on domestic debt as a direct charge against the central banks gross 
income. As Table 1 indicates, in recent years the Bank of Uganda has made a small profit 
but there is no guarantee that this will persist. Indeed, given the current structure of rates, 
the Bank would make a loss at the margin for every dollar of foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation funded by domestic borrowing. While these losses are currently more than 
offset by the income from seigniorage, this is not inevitable. 
 
From  a  monetary  policy  perspective,  the  most  important  determinant  of  whether  the 
capital base is sufficient is whether the Bank of Uganda can issue paper that is perceived 
to be genuinely 'gilt-edged' and invulnerable to nominal default risk.  This is more than 
ensuring that any given stock of debt could be honoured; it requires that the private sector 
believe that the central bank has the operational independence to employ its instruments 
so as to credibly achieve its monetary policy objectives, both now and in the future. 
 
Ensuring that the central  bank  has  sufficient resources at its  back could  be achieved 
through modifications in the Bank's operating regulations and/or an explicit subvention or 
through  capitalization.    A  subvention  mechanism,  which  would  most  likely  entail  a 
statutory call on the government budget, suffers from the same incentive problems as 
currently exist by drawing the Bank  into repeated engagement with government over 
funding  and  thereby  risking  market  perceptions  of  the  central  bank’s  de  facto 
independence. 
 
This leaves the option of 'one-off' re-capitalizing the central bank in order to provide an 
on-going income stream sufficient to allow it to pursue its policy mandate unhindered by 
concerns  about  its  own  net  income  position.    Recapitalization  entails  engineering  an 
internal fiscal capital transfer or pre-empting part of the external surplus. Neither are 
simple:  On  the  internal  side,  the  most  straightforward  is  through  a  transfer  from  
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government of interest bearing assets which could be claims on the public or private 
institutions.  They could  be equities or bonds.  On the external side they  could be a 
transfer of the net foreign asset position of the economy to the central bank.  Stella (2008) 
describes  a  number  of  such  transfer  mechanisms,  ranging  from  the  transfer  of  oil 
revenues in the case of Norway to a series of tranched budgetary releases by parliament 
to the Central Bank of Chile.  In both cases, these transfers were invested by the relevant 
central bank to generate an income stream. 
 
Such  options  do  not  readily  exist  in  Uganda  at  present.    Domestic  bond  and  equity 
markets are probably not deep enough at present to undertake an internal transfer..  On 
the external side, there is no trade surplus before aid to pre-empt (the prospect of re-
capitalization through oil revenues  is at best a long way off). This  leaves the capital 
account  and  reserves.    While  in  principle,  government  could  seek  foreign  equity 
participation in the central bank, this seems inappropriate for a range of political reasons. 
But one form of foreign participation that may be feasible and more palatable would be to 
seek  to  use  some  portion  of  the  aid  flow  to  government  for  capitalization,  not on  a 
recurrent flow basis, but as a one-off capital transfer. 
 
A  further  alternative  might  be  to  capitalize  the  Bank  by  reassigning  (across  the 
consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the  public  sector)  some  portion  of  the  official  net 
international reserves.  Though current conditions may not be immediately favourable, 
this  re-capitalization  process  could  be  undertaken  gradually  through  a  programme  of 




2.  INFLATION CONTROL AND THE RESERVE MONEY PROGRAMMING 
 
The  third  way  in  which  we  might  pose  the  question  of  whether  monetary  policy  in 
Uganda has been too costly is in terms of a well-defined counterfactual.  Specifically, the 
question is whether the instruments of monetary policy could have been deployed in a 
manner which would support a higher sustainable growth in real output and/or lower 
volatility in output and consumption without yielding on the inflation target.  This is the 
question that is addressed in this and the next section.  In doing so, we draw heavily on 
analytical work by Adam et al (2008) in which we use a fully-specified simulation model 
calibrated to reflect the fundamental characteristics of an economy such as Uganda to 
analyse the properties of alternative monetary policy rules. The conclusion from these 
sections is that there have been episodes in the recent past where policy choices probably 
did lead to a monetary stance that was inefficiently tight, but that changes in operating 
procedures  in  Uganda  in  recent  years  have  substantially  eliminated  previous  policy 
errors. 
 
                                                 
12   This proposal has similarities to the recently-enacted Deposit Auction Facility of 2008 which has 
allowed interest earnings on foreign reserves in excess of the program target to defray the cost incurred on 
auctioned deposits.   
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As noted, Uganda’s impressive record on inflation over the last decade has been anchored 
by a relentless adherence to a tight reserve money programme, heavily buttressed by the 
cash-budget fiscal rule.  In recent years, however, concerns have been raised about the 
continued efficacy of the reserve money programme.  The first is that the programme is 
becoming less successful at anchoring inflation and the second is that its operation has 
stifled both the lending activities of the banking system and the development of effective 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission.   
 
The  reserve  money  programme  in  Uganda  nests  a  money-based  nominal  anchor  for 
inflation within a quantity theory of money framework.  The proximate anchor is the 
broad money supply (M), whose path the monetary authorities seek to influence though 
balance sheet operations aimed at controlling the path of reserve money (H).
13  Control of 
the latter has typically been implemented in the context of an IMF programme where a 
ceiling on the overall growth in reserve money has been combined with a floor on growth 
of net foreign assets (NIR).  Together these targets imply a ceiling on net domestic asset 
(NDA) growth. 
 
The sources of  instability  in a reserve  money programme can  be  highlighted through 
some simple  manipulation of the  identity underpinning the quantity theory of  money 
which takes the form  
 
(7)        t t t t M v Py =  
 
where M denotes the broad money supply, P the price level, v the velocity of circulation, 
y real output, and t is a time index.  From (7) we can derive the link between money 
growth and an inflation target that underpins the Uganda programme.  To do so, we first 
compute the change in the natural log of (7), noting that for any variable X the change in 
the  natural  log  is  approximately  the  growth  rate  of  X.  Thus 
1 1 ˆ ln ( )/ t t t t t X X X X X − − ∆ ≈ − =  denotes the growth rate in X. It follows that  ln t t P π ∆ ≈ is 
the  rate  of  inflation.    Denoting  target  variables  by  a  star  (*)  and  projections  by  the 
superscript    p,  we  obtain  a  target  growth  rate  for  broad  money,  conditional  on 
assumptions about the growth in real income and the velocity of circulation 
 
(8)       
* * ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
p p
t t t t M y v π = + −  
 
Next, denoting by m the money multiplier, we can define the ex ante relationship between 
the target growth rate of the broad money stock and reserve money (H)  
 
(9)       
* * ˆ ˆ ˆ
p
t t t M m H = +  
 
Combining (8) with (9) we derive an inflation-consistent reaction function for reserve 
money growth  
                                                 
13  The authorities track both M2A and M3 measures of money where the latter includes onshore foreign 




(10)       
* * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
p p p
t t t t t H y v m π = + − −  
 
Finally, from the asset-side counterpart to reserve money  t t t H Z D = + , where Z denotes 
net international reserves and D net domestic assets.  Letting  / z Z H θ = denote the long-
run share of net international reserves in reserve money, we can express the growth in 
base  money as 




(11)       
* * * 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
(1 ) (1 )
p p p Z
t t t t t t
Z Z




  = + − − −   − −
 
 
Equation (11) therefore defines the target growth rate for net domestic assets given the 
inflation target, the projected growth in income, assumptions about the growth in velocity 
and the money multiplier, and the target growth rate in net international reserves.  For 
any  given  inflation  target, the  permitted  growth  in  net  domestic  assets  (the  principle 
component of which is domestic credit to government) increases with faster projected 
growth, a decline in velocity and/or the money multiplier, but decreases the higher the 
rate of net foreign asset accumulation. 
 
Equations (10) and (11) thus describe the ex ante operation of a conventional reserve-
money (or NDA) programme such as the one used in Uganda.
15   Under the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), government lays out annual targets for real GDP 
growth, inflation and its anticipated domestic deficit financing requirement. These are 
combined with the Bank of Uganda’s estimates for the velocity of circulation and money 
multiplier to derive a target path for reserve money which, in turn, is integrated with the 
government’s projections for net domestic credit and the programmed level of foreign 
exchange reserve accumulation to determine a target for net domestic assets (and hence 
the anticipated level of bond sterilization). 
 
With  some  simple  manipulation,  they  also  provide  a  useful  basis  for  decomposing 
deviations of actual inflation from the inflation target. 
 
First, note that the quantity equation (10) holds both as a description of behaviour ex ante 
and as an accounting identity ex post, allowing us to write (8) and (9) as follows, where 
the absence of any superscripts indicates actual outcomes. 
 
(8’)        ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) t t t t M y v π = + −  
                                                 
14  The growth in net foreign assets consists of two components  1 t t t t t Z E z E z − ∆ = ∆ +∆ where the second 
term represents revaluation effects.  This term does not contribute to the growth in reserve money but an 
increase in the net worth of the central bank.  The expression  ˆ
t Z in equation (11) thus excludes exchange 
evaluation effects. 




(9’)        ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t M m H = +  
 
so that (10) becomes  
 
(10’)        ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) t t t t t H y v m π = + − −  
 
By the nature of identities, the terms  ˆ ˆ  and  t t v m are now endogenous, in other words they 
are the ‘solved-out’ actual values of the change in velocity and the money multiplier that 
satisfy  the  identities  (8’)  and  (9’).    Combining  (10’)  with  (10)  we  derive  a  simple 
expression for the deviation of actual inflation from its target as 
 
(12)     
* * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p p p
t t t t t t t t t t H H y y v v m m π π − = − − − + − + −  
 
From equation (12), the over-shooting of inflation relative to target can be explained in 
terms of the conventional determinants, namely excess growth in base money (reflecting 
demand-side  pressures)  and/or  slower  than  projected  real  output  growth  (reflecting 
supply-side  pressures)  as  well  structural  determinants  namely  the  deviations  in  the 
growth rate of velocity and the money multiplier relative to their projected values. We 
consider each in turn to help understand recent inflation dynamics. 
 
Conventional factors, recent inflationary pressures and the policy response  
 
In recent months, and in line with most economies in the region, domestic inflation has 
risen sharply and is now substantially above the Bank of Uganda target of 5 percent per 
annum.  Headline inflation reached 15.6 percent per annum in August 2008 and core 
inflation  13.4  percent  per  annum.    By  May  2009  the  corresponding  rates  were  12.4 
percent for headline and 10.3 percent for core.  Whilst some of this acceleration reflects 
one-off  tariff  adjustments,  including  for  water,  whose  effect  will  be  temporary,  the 
month-on-month  price  indices  suggest that  inflationary  pressures  are  more  persistent. 
This reflects both demand side and supply-side factors.  Aggregate demand pressures are 
partly  reflected  in  the  widening  of  the  current  account  deficit,  which  is  projected  to 
increase from 8.6 percent of GDP in 2006/07 to 12.6 percent in 2007/08 and almost 14 
percent in 2008/09.
16  This increased deficit, which is the counterpart to strong growth in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), remittances and continued official aid flows, is also 
associated  with  substantial  demand  pressures  in  the  non-tradable  goods  and  services 
sectors such as in housing and construction. 
  
In the short run, however, the strongest pressures on inflation come from the supply side, 
most notably from the recent rise in world prices for energy and food.  Given Uganda’s 
geography and the state of its infrastructure, which means transport and energy account 
                                                 
16  IMF (2008b).  These figures reflect the current account deficit before grants.  The corresponding figures 
for the current account after aid show an even sharper increase, moving from 2.0 percent in 2006/07 to 8 
percent in 2007/08 and 9.5 percent in 2008/09.  
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for a substantial share of total input costs, the pass-through from energy prices to core 
inflation is rapid and substantial.  At the same time, the impact of the rise in world food 
and commodity prices across the region as a whole has shifted regional demand in favour 
of  Ugandan-produced  substitutes.    In  the  medium  term  this  is  a  wholly  favourable 
development, but to the extent that there is limited capacity to increase output in the 
short-run, these demand effects are likely to be inflationary (even if they do have positive 
balance of payments effects). 
 
In  general,  the  first-round  price  effects  of  supply-side  shocks  to  inflation  are  best 
accommodated, which is why such prices are typically excluded from core-inflation in 
inflation targeting regimes.  But if these shocks are persistent they will feed through into 
firms’ cost structure and hence into price setting in the wider economy.  Other things 
equal, this puts downward pressure on the equilibrium path for real wages and calls for 
some degree of tightening of the monetary stance to ensure inflation expectations remain 
anchored to the long run inflation target.  
 
In  assessing  their  response  to  these  conventional  developments,  the  authorities  must 
consider two factors.  The first is how tight the squeeze needs to be and the second is how 
rapid.  How tight will depend on the authorities’ view on the strength of the aggregate 
demand pressures and on their assessment of key supply side developments. 
 
First, the authorities must take a view on the likely persistence of the world food and fuel 
price  increases  and  hence  estimate  the  indirect,  second-round,  effects  of  these  on 
domestic pricing.  The more temporary the shock is perceived to be, the stronger the case 
for accommodation (i.e. letting the price rises feed through to the domestic price-level in 
the short run in the expectation that beyond the initial jump in prices, the inflationary 
effect will be short-lived).  However, given the relatively low price elasticity of demand 
for fuel and the limited scope for a rapid global supply response given the two decades of 
under-investment high energy prices are likely to be persistent.  Similar arguments may 
be advanced  for world  food prices, which  in turn  may  be exacerbated by the energy 
intensity of food production and the pressures coming from the demand for bio-fuels.  
The implication, then, is that these shocks are likely to persist.  Set against this, however, 
is the question of how recent developments in global financial markets may affect this 
assessment. 
 
Since Uganda remains a net importer of fuel (if not food) this represents a worsening of 
the terms of trade, ceteris paribus, to which the economy needs to adjust if it is to remain 
competitive.  In the context of an inflation target, the relevant question is then whether 
wage  bargainers  would  be  prepared  to  accept  a  cut  in  real  wages  coming  from  a 
worsening in the terms of trade, without requiring a compensating increase in money 
wages.  The evidence from OECD economies during the early phase of the current oil 
price boom suggests that the credibility of monetary regimes did ensure that the rising oil 
prices entailed relative price changes and a squeeze in real wages without triggering a rise 
in average inflation (Blanchard and Gali, 2007).  This has not been the case since 2007, 
however,  as  inflation  rates  have  sharply  moved  outside  target  ranges,  albeit  by  
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substantially less than a full pass-through of the oil and food price increases would have 
entailed. 
 
Similar  logic  applies  to  developments  in  domestic  food  prices,  but  in  this  case  the 
assessment also depends on the capacity of domestic producers to respond to demand 
from the region.  This is part of a broader assessment of the dynamics of the current 
investment boom and in particular the speed with which investment expenditure, which 
adds to demand pressures, translates into an effective expansion in potential output.  This 
then is a question about the position of the long-run aggregate supply curve and the slope 
of the short-run curve.  A pessimistic view, which sees limited increase in potential and a 
steep  slope  in  the  short-run,  will  lead  the  authorities  to  bear  down  aggressively  on 
demand in the short run at the cost of undermining the efficient installation of capacity.  
An over-optimistic assessment, on the other hand, built on the belief that the short-run 
supply curve is flat and that the investment boom will stimulate a large increase in long-
run potential output, will induce too loose a stance and thereby risk entrenching higher 
inflation expectations and lower external competitiveness. 
 
How quickly the authorities should seek to bring inflation back towards its target is also a 
critical question.  This is a problem for all monetary authorities, not just those operating 
explicit full-fledged inflation targeting regimes.  It is particularly acute at present for 
those industrialized economies that are experiencing inflation rates far in excess of their 
targets but have also  been  hit  my adverse shocks arising  from the credit crunch and 
widespread  failure  of  the  financial  sector.    While  the  former  suggests  a  degree  of 
tightening, the systemic risks posed by the latter means that a further loosening of the 
stance is probably required.  Whether this undermines the credibility of the central bank 
depends,  it  is  argued,  on  the  ability  of  the  authorities  to  communicate  their  policy 
position.    Attempts  to  bring  inflation  back  to  its  target  too  rapidly  are  dangerous, 
especially  when  the  economy  has  been  hit  by  adverse  shocks.    It  risks  putting 
unnecessary real costs on the economy, undermines the central bank’s credibility and 
might erode political confidence in the inflation targeting regime. 
 
The problem is probably less acute in Uganda at present.  There is a case for tightening in 
practice and in signaling clearly that some tightening is taking place and may be expected 
to continue.  But this should not be too aggressive for at least two reasons.  The first is 
that some of the one-off price adjustments which have boosted inflation in recent months 
will pass through in the coming months.  The second reason reflects uncertainty around 
the current crisis in global financial markets. 
 
Because Uganda, like most low-income countries in Africa, is not closely integrated into 
global asset markets, it is relatively sheltered from the first-round effects of the credit 
crisis.  The impact will, however, be felt as the credit crisis feeds into the real economy 
and into global demand pressures.  There is little doubt that the major western economies 
are entering a recessionary phase but the implications for countries such as Uganda will 
depend to a large extent on the reaction of the large fast-growing economies of China and 
India.    It  is  too  early  to  judge  exactly  how  demand  conditions  will  evolve  over  the  
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coming months but it is likely that, they will conspire to ease supply-side inflationary 
pressures, although this may be offset by falling export commodity prices. 
 
Structural factors: shifts in velocity and shifts in the money multiplier 
 
Equation (12) also shows how a failure to hit the inflation forecast can also emanate from 
higher-than-anticipated  growth  in  the  velocity  of  circulation  and  from  a  higher-than-
anticipated growth in the money multiplier.  These reflect changing portfolio behaviour 
on the part of the private sector and the banking system respectively. 
 
Most ex ante reserve money programmes assume velocity and the money multiplier are 
relatively  stable  (around  a  trend)  and  thus  relatively  predictable  so  that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 and ( ) 0
p p
t t t t v v m m − ≈ − ≈ .  In Uganda this was a pretty reasonable approximation 
during most of the post-1992 period – which gave the reserve money programme its heft 
– but since 2000 both ratios have become increasingly volatile and less predictable. 
 
The velocity of circulation (which reflects the underlying structural demand for money) 
has become much less stable as a result of the de facto openness of the capital account 
which means that domestic and foreign asset holders are more able to rapidly adjust their 
asset  portfolios  in  response  to  changing  (expected)  economic  conditions,  both  in  the 
domestic and regional economy.
17  In recent years, positive changes in sentiment have 
underpinned  both  a  surge  in  remittances  and  other  private  capital  inflows  (including 
‘carry-trade’  incentives  arising  directly  from  persistent  interest  rate  differentials)  and 
have  shifted  the  relative  demand  for  financial  assets,  including  money,  in  favour  of 
Shilling-based assets.  In addition, developments in the regional economy, ranging from 
the improved security situation in Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan to the political 
turmoil  in  Kenya  in  early  2008  have  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  the  Ugandan 
Shilling  as  a  regional  reserve  currency,  thereby  stimulating  an  autonomous  shift  in 
velocity.  How persistent this regional portfolio shift proves to be is difficult to predict. 
 
Unanticipated  shifts  in  the  money  multiplier  function  in  exactly  the  same  way.    An 
increase in the money multiplier increases the leverage of growth in the monetary base on 
broad money and hence inflation, other things equal. The multiplier will rise if the either 
there is a shift by the banks in favour of cash relative to deposits and/or a fall in the 
reserves to deposit ratio.
18  In addition, shifts between domestic and foreign currency 
deposits will generate autonomous shifts in the money multiplier if the targeted money 
                                                 
17  When there are limits on capital account transactions agents can only adjust their wealth portfolios 
slowly by increasing or decreasing the current account; with an open capital account adjustment can be 
virtually instantaneous. 
18  Defining base money (H) and broad money (M) in terms of the liability-side of the relevant balance 
sheets, where C denoted cash in circulation, R reserves of the banking system, and D the deposit liabilities 









  where 
c denotes the cash ration (C/D) and r the reserve to deposit ratio (R/D).  The derivatives 
 and  0 c r m m < <  follow directly.  
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supply  is  an  M2  measure  as  opposed  to  an  M3  measure  including  foreign  currency 
deposits (Berg and Borenzstein, 2000). 
 
The  post-stabilization  period  in  Uganda  has  seen  the  multiplier  shift  substantially  in 
response  to  changes  on  both  the  liability  and  asset  sides  of  the  banking  sector’s 
consolidated balance sheet.  On the liability side, there has been a steady decline in the 
cash to deposit ratio, c, from around 40 percent of M3 in the early 1990s to around 30 
percent  today,  and  a  corresponding  but  slightly  larger  increase  in  foreign  currency 
deposits which now account for approximately 30 percent of M3.  In both cases the big 
trend changes occurred in the late 1990s (Figure 4). 
 
Even so, the cash to deposit ratio remains volatile and, fundamentally outside the control 
of the authorities. For example, as low inflation becomes more entrenched and financial 
innovations -- such as the use of cheques, credit and debit cards and especially ATM 
machines and the emergence of mobile-phone-based cash transfer services -- take root, 
we might expect the cash ratio to decline, as it has done worldwide. But in Uganda, the 
cash ratio has actually risen quite steadily since around 2003, most likely reflecting the 
gradual formalization of previously informal economic activities, especially in the rural 
economy, and, as noted, the increase in the use of the Ugandan Shilling as a regional 
reserve currency.  In both cases, the demand for money is likely to be dominated by the 
demand for cash rather than bank-based deposits. 
 
Similar factors are in play on the asset side.  Historically, banks in Uganda, as elsewhere 
in Africa, have consistently held excess reserves (Figure 5).  Banks are required to hold 
the equivalent of 9.5 percent of their total deposit liabilities, both Shilling and foreign 
currency  denominated,  in  the  form  of  unremunerated  cash  balances  at  the  Bank  of 
Uganda.
19  In practice, banks’ reserves typically exceed this minimum by around 4 to 5 
percent of total deposit liabilities.  Over time, there has been a substantial and steady 
decline in banks’ excess liquidity, absolutely – from around 20 percent of deposits in the 
mid-1990s to below 12 percent in 2007 -- and relative to the required minimum. But the 
reserve ratio also remains volatile. 
 
Whether this volatility matters for the conduct of policy depends to a large extent on 
whether excess liquidity is viewed as precautionary or involuntary.  In the former case 
banks voluntarily hold reserves in excess of the statutory requirement to meet their own 
precautionary  requirements  which,  for  example,  may  reflect  extreme  volatility  in  the 
deposit  base  or  unavoidably  high  lending  risks.    By  contrast,  ‘involuntary  excess 
liquidity’ reflects a low or zero opportunity cost to reserves on the margin.  In either case, 
the  existence  of  large  excess  reserves  undermines  the  effectiveness  of  reserve 
requirements as instruments of monetary policy, because changes in the required reserve 
ratio require no adjustment in the overall volume of bank loans and deposits. Rather the 
money multiplier adjusts endogenously.   
 
But the reaction to an increase in bank liquidity is different.  If banks maintain excess 
reserves on a prudential basis, then an increase in bank liquidity is likely to be allocated 
                                                 
19 Banks are also permitted to count 40 percent of their vault cash as reserves.   
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partly to reserves and partly to new loans. By contrast, where excess reserves reflect a 
very low marginal return to lending net of intermediation costs – a situation that is more 
likely where legal minimum deposit rates are binding and/or banks have monopoly power 
in the loan market – policy instruments that alter the monetary base may have little or no 
impact  on  lending  conditions  and  broader  monetary  aggregates  since  the  money 
multiplier  will  adjust  endogenously  to  movements  in  base  money.  The  impact  on 
economic activity will therefore be nugatory. 
 
Implications for the reserve money programme 
 
The key point, both in terms of shifts in velocity and shifts in the money multiplier is that 
these movements reflect behavioural shifts which are not only outside the control of the 
monetary authorities but are difficult to predict.  
 
The reserve money programme as typically construed is unusually poorly structured to 
handle  such  changes,  as  can  be  seen  from  equation  (12).    Consider  the  case  where, 
starting from a position where the economy is hitting its inflation target, it experiences a 
positive but unanticipated shift in the demand for money, leading to a fall in the velocity 
of circulation.  How this translates into price (and exchange rate) dynamics depends on 
the monetary response.  For convenience, assume both that there is no short-run impact 
on growth, so that the latter remains on target such that  ˆ ˆ ( ) 0
p
t t y y − = , and that the capital 
inflow has no impact on the growth of the money multiplier so that  ˆ ˆ ( ) 0
p
t t m m − = . 
 
In the case of a pure  exchange rate  float, the central  bank does  not intervene  in the 
foreign  exchange  market  so  that the  market-clearing  price  of  foreign  exchange  falls, 
appreciating the Shilling, thereby lowering the cost of imports and squeezing the net trade 
position.    If  the  fall  in  velocity  is  not  accommodated,  so  that 
* ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 t t H H − = ,  the 
increased growth in money demand is not associated by a corresponding increase in the 
growth of the supply of money.  Money market equilibrium is thus restored by a fall in 
inflation and the target is under-shot. 
 
If, on the other hand, the authorities respond to the latent pressure on the exchange rate 
by intervening to buy foreign exchange, this will increase net international reserves and 
lead to an incipient growth in reserve money.  Strict adherence to the reserve money 
programme  requires 
* ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 t t H H − =   so  that  the  authorities  are  drawn  into  bond 
sterilization of this growth to keep reserve money on track (i.e. the increased growth in 
net international reserves is offset by a reduction in net domestic assets as the authorities 
sell debt).  This entails upward pressure on interest rates, thereby contracting aggregate 
demand through the interest rate channel. 
 
In  both  cases,  the  failure  to  accommodate  the  downward  shift  in  velocity  leads  to 
monetary policy imparting an inappropriate deflationary impulse.  How this is achieved 
and which sectors feel the brunt varies; in the former case this is achieved through an 
exchange rate appreciation / inflation under-shoot – hitting in the first instance the export  
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sector -- and in the latter through higher interest rates, thereby impacting the domestic 
economy. 
 
The same logic applies in reverse; unanticipated adverse velocity shocks that are not met 
by a tightening of reserve money will lead inflation to overshoot, other things equal. 
 
3.  EXTERNAL SHOCKS, PORTFOLIO FLOWS AND BOND STERILIZATION 
 
In the context of a reserve money programme, the logical implication from the forgoing 
is that the appropriate policy response to this sort of structural shift is to allow for an 
offsetting accommodation, i.e. an increase in the growth of reserve money.  In practice 
this  may  entail  unsterilized  intervention,  so  that  reserve  money  growth  is  achieved 
through  a  rise  in  net  international  reserves.    Alternatively,  if  the  authorities  remain 
committed to a pure float, the required increase in the supply of money may be affected 
by a ‘reverse sterilization’ under which the central bank engineers an increase in base 
money through the purchase (retirement) of domestic debt instruments. 
 
Two contrasting examples 
 
While the simple logic is watertight, both responses are often counter-intuitive in the 
context of the reserve money programme, most probably because the programme tends to 
focus  attention  on  the  instrument  (reserve  money)  rather  than  the  ultimate  target 
(inflation).      The  reaction  to  two  recent  episodes  in  Uganda  illustrates  contrasting 
reactions to velocity shocks.  The first episode is the aid surge 1999 and 2003.  During 
this period high aid inflows were accompanied by a strong private portfolio switches in 
favour  of  domestic  money.    Velocity  fell  sharply  as  private  capital  flowed  into  the 
economy.    The  combined  effect  of  the  surge  of  official  and  private  capital  was  an 
appreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
 
Faced with pressures to lean against the real appreciation, the Bank of Uganda was drawn 
into heavy foreign exchange intervention.  However, the failure to recognize the shift in 
velocity meant that the Bank acted too aggressively to sterilize the growth in liquidity 
arising from the intervention in order to keep reserve money growth in line with the 
original target.  The direct consequence was that between 1998 and 2001 domestic debt 
tripled in value, albeit from an extremely low level (around 1.5 percent of GDP in 1998), 
and by 2001/02 domestic debt service accounted for almost 5 percent of domestic tax 
revenues. The pressure to sell domestic debt put enormous pressure on domestic interest 
rates which rose from around 7.5 percent in the first quarter of 2000 to around 20 percent 
a year later.  This episode was the origin of the current anxiety about the high cost of 
monetary policy in Uganda. 
 
Attempts to target the real exchange rate (at a more depreciated rate than its equilibrium) 
are only possible if the authorities are prepared to let domestic interest rates exceed their 
equilibrium.  So, even if there had been no shift in velocity, it is likely that real interest 
rates  in  Uganda  would  have  risen  at  this  time.    However,  these  pressures  were  
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exacerbated by the concurrent shift in money demand so that domestic interest rates were 
driven even higher than they otherwise would have been.  
 
This, contrasts with the second episode which was the Bank of Uganda’s response to the 
sharp private capital  inflow  in  June 2007 (see IMF, 2008a).  In this case, there was 
another well-defined portfolio shift (i.e. a sharp decline in velocity) and as before, the 
authorities, concerned to avoid excessive exchange rate volatility, intervened heavily to 
stabilize the exchange rate (i.e. selling Shillings for dollars at the prevailing rate).  But in 
this case, the Bank correctly recognized the nature of the portfolio shift and did not seek 
to sterilize the growth in reserve money arising from intervention.  Thus the increased 
demand  for  money  was  accommodated  by  letting  the  supply  of  liquidity  increase.  
Reserve money growth exceeded its programme target but given the shift in velocity this 
was, of itself, not inflationary.  Had the authorities followed their earlier practice and 
attempted to stick to their reserve  money target, the consequence would  have been a 
sharp increase in domestic interest rates and either a greater deflationary shock to the 
economy or further private capital inflows seeking to take advantage of the interest rate 
differential. 
 
The lessons learnt were important and have underpinned the decision to move away from 
a tight adherence to the RM programme at the end of 2007 in favour or anchoring the 
programme  on  NDA.
20        Recognizing  these  problems,  from  December  2007,  the 
programme was modified so that the near-term target became the net domestic assets of 
the central bank (NDA) rather than RM, (which is to remain as an ‘indicative’ target) 
thereby allowing for greater flexibility in response to portfolio (money demand) shocks. 
 
Inflation targets and the exchange rate: reconciling competing objectives 
 
As we discuss in more detail in Section V, one powerful argument for adoption of a full-
fledged inflation targeting is that it automatically avoids the problem of anticipating and 
responding to velocity shocks which in the context of reserve money programming alter 
the relationship between the intermediate and ultimate target of policy and can draw the 
authorities into policy errors of the kind just described.  Under an inflation targeting (IT) 




Thus a conventional presentation of the inflation-targeting literature argues for a clear 
and unambiguous prioritization of the inflation target with the authorities forgoing any 
attempt to manage the exchange rate.  This argument that the authorities should not target 
the  exchange  rate  does  not  imply  that  they  should  ignore  it  --  not  least  because  the 
exchange rate plays a central role in forecasting inflation – but that it should be made 
                                                 
20 Note that with this revision, the programme in Uganda now has no formal nominal anchor.  Only if the 
floor on NIR is binding will a ceiling on NDA allow RM to be controlled.  If NIR floats off its floor, the 
anchor is lost.  This, in some sense, is the hall mark of moves towards full-fledged IT: a formal but non-
institutionalized inflation target, multiple objectives and only partial adherence to a well-defined monetary 
anchor. 
21  This does not, of course, mean that the authorities should ignore velocity or multiplier shocks since they 
enter directly into the monetary transmission mechanism.  
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clear that the authorities are not beholden to any specific value of the currency, thereby 
removing  incentives  for  speculative  attacks.    Moreover,  the  argument  goes,  a  non-
interventionist stance creates the positive incentives for the private sector to develop the 
capacity to price and manage exchange rate risk. 
 
But this argument probably does not do justice to the centrality of the exchange rate in 
low-income  countries  such  as  Uganda.    Money  and  foreign  exchange  markets  are 
extremely thin both relative to the size of the economy and, more importantly, relative to 
the size of the shocks they face.  The idea that the foreign exchange market can fully 
absorb the kind of external volatility facing Uganda is fanciful so that some degree of 
intervention is almost inevitable. 
 
This concern is magnified if the economy is also subject to portfolio shifts. The standard 
approach  to  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regime  finds  fixed  exchange  rates  to  be 
preferable  (for  stabilizing  output)  when  portfolio  shocks  are  dominant,  because  these 
shocks require portfolio reallocation but not real exchange rate adjustment; floating rates, 
in contrast, are preferable when real shocks, which require real exchange rate adjustment, 
are dominant. Exposure to portfolio shifts, which arise as an inevitable counterpart to 
open capital accounts and thin domestic asset markets, may therefore create substantial 
tensions  between  de  jure  commitments  to  flexible  exchange  rates  in  support  of  an 
inflation  or  money  anchor  and  the  de  facto  conduct  of  monetary  policy  which  may 
involve substantial intervention.  
 
This tension is highlighted in the management of aid inflows which present the fiscal and 
monetary  authorities  with  the  dual  problem  of  managing  the  real  absorption  of  the 
resource transfer and, in addition, managing the foreign exchange inflows and liquidity 
generation associated with the resource transfer. Many of these problems are discussed in 
the context of Uganda by Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile (2007) who note that, 
amongst other things, the shift in favour of budget support mechanisms reinforces the 
link between aid flows and domestic credit creation and hence draws the central bank 
directly into concerns about exchange rate volatility and liquidity management. 
 
Recent work by Adam et al (2008) uses simulation methods to examine how different 
monetary rules handle volatile aid inflows in circumstances where portfolio shifts are 
important.    This  work  shows  that  policy  rules  that  involve  a  degree  of  unsterilized 
exchange  rate  intervention  tend  to  deliver  lower  volatility  in  inflation,  interest  rates, 
exchange  rates  and  output than  either  of  the  strategies  implied  under  a  conventional 
reserve  money programme,  namely a pure  float or one of exchange rate  intervention 
supported  by  bond  sterilization.  This  contrast  is  particularly  stark  if  fiscal  spending 
matches aid inflows by less than dollar-for-dollar, possibly because of concerns about 
short-to medium run absorptive capacity or because the fiscal authorities are keen to use 
aid to reduce domestic deficit financing (both motivations being present in Uganda in the 
last decade). 
 
To understand why this is so it is important to consider what is happening to velocity and, 
hence, why a pure exchange rate float may lead to excess volatility.  The essential step is  
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that aid inflow (or other autonomous capital inflows) will tend to lead to a positive shift 
in the demand for money, more so if part of the aid is saved.
22  This shift reflects, in part, 
an income effect, but also the reduction in expected inflation contingent on the fall in 
domestic budget deficit, since the unspent component of the aid substitutes for domestic 
seigniorage financing of the deficit.  In these circumstances, a pure float (which we also 
can think of as full and instantaneous foreign exchange sterilization) which entails no 
increase in reserve money, triggers exactly the outcome noted above; namely an under-
shoot of inflation and/or an excess appreciation in the nominal exchange rate.
23  Over 
time, this pattern of response to aid flows will generate higher volatility in the nominal 
exchange  rate  and  inflation.  Sterilized  intervention  has  the  same  deflationary  effects 
although  in  this  case  the  squeeze  on  reserve  money  growth  is  reflected  in  high  and 
volatile domestic interest rates. 
 
By contrast, rules that seek to match the evolution in the demand for money by injecting 
corresponding liquidity will perform better.  In the context of a long-run commitment to a 
flexible exchange rate, one such rule is the reserve buffer plus float, under which foreign 
exchange sales are tied directly to the growth in liquidity generated by domestic spending 
out of aid, where the latter is governed by the absorptive capacity of government.  This 
entails  initially  accumulating  aid  inflows  as  official  foreign  exchange  reserves  (i.e. 
initially  stabilizing  the  nominal  exchange  rate)  and  then  sterilizing  the  full  domestic 
currency counterpart of aid-financed non-import spending through foreign exchange sales 
as it occurs (i.e. letting the exchange rate float).
24   The key point here is that the initial 
(unsterilized) intervention increases the supply of reserve money but does so exactly in 
line with the increase in money demand, thereby stabilizing inflation. 
 
It  is  important  to  stress  three  critical  features  of  this  rule.    The  first  is  that  by 
accommodating the demand for money / portfolio shift this rule stabilizes the path for the 
nominal exchange rate (relative to the pure float).  The second is that the intervention 
injects liquidity at exactly the time that there is an increased demand for liquidity so that 
no further bond sterilization is required. 
 
The third key  point  is that while allowing  for  exchange rate  intervention to forestall 
otherwise damaging exchange rate volatility this rule remains consistent with an inflation 
target and a fundamental commitment to a floating exchange rate.   
 
                                                 
22  Over the 1990s, the average propensity to save out of aid inflows in post-stabilization African economies 
was approximately 0.25 (Adam et al 2008). 
23 Notice what is going on here.  The pure float leaves the money supply unchanged while demand for 
money increases.  Domestic money is now relatively scarce so that its equilibrium price increases (the 
exchange rate appreciates) 
24 The implicit assumption here is that budgetary aid accrues in the form of dollar deposits at the central 
bank. Until aid dollars are sold by the central bank, an aid surge has no impact on reserve money because 
net international reserves and net domestic credit to government change in equal and opposite directions. 
As aid is spent (increasing the fiscal deficit), the import component of spending continues to leave domestic 
liquidity unchanged because net international reserves fall by the import component of the rise in the fiscal 
deficit (while in the background, net domestic credit rises by the same amount). The liquidity injection 
associated with aid corresponds to the non-import component of aid-financed spending. A buffer plus float 
policy uses foreign exchange sales to sterilize this in full, leaving seigniorage unchanged.  
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Whereas under a conventional exchange rate crawl the central bank targets the nominal 
exchange rate, without reference to the pattern liquidity creation, under the buffer plus 
float, the central bank does not pay direct attention to the nominal exchange rate. Instead 
it sets a time-varying reserve target that corresponds to aid financing that has not yet been 
spent, and allows the exchange rate to float freely once this reserve target is satisfied. 
 
The  original  work  by  Adam  et  al  (2008)  focuses  principally  on  aid  flows  and  the 
associated shifts in the demand for money that may accompanying them.  But the key 
insight applies to all circumstances where external shocks are expected to be associated 
with portfolio shifts.  The most obvious parallel arises in the context of commodity price 
volatility especially in natural-resource economies where fiscal linkages via the budget 
mean the transmission channels from external price volatility to the domestic economy 
closely resemble those operating in the presence of aid volatility (see Adam and Goderis, 
2008). 
 
To summarize, the buffer plus float class of policy rule retains the anchor of an explicit 
inflation target but offers a clear articulation of how the authorities should act in the face 
of a particular set of events, specifically those which may be expected to lead to a shift in 
the demand for money.  In this sense, the rule is an (analytical) formalization of the NDA 
anchor currently being employed by the Bank of Uganda. 
 
Embedding  this  kind  of  flexibility  within  a  coherent  monetary  framework  requires 
coherence both at the level of policy coordination and in terms of communication.  We 
return to this issue in Section V. 
 
Bond sterilization and financial sector development 
 
One of the implications of this analysis is that faced with favourable asset portfolio shifts 
induced by aid and private capital inflows, there is a risk of ‘excess’ bond sterilization 
The previous section has stressed the impact of this strategy on the exchange rate and 
domestic  interest  rates  and  the  consequent  deflationary  risks  this  imposes  on  the 
economy.  But there may be other structural concerns in play.  In particular, the Bank 
should probably be concerned about the potential effects substantial bond-sterilization 
may have for the nascent development of local capital markets. Heavy bond sterilization 
risks distorting domestic asset markets in favour of short-dated public debt.  Through the 
early years of the century Treasury bills rapidly grew to dominate banks’ assets.  By 2002 
claims against central government exceeded claims on the private sector (see Figure 6).  
As noted above, this dominance of the banks' asset book has declined quite sharply in 
recent years as lending to the private sector has picked up but public debt still features 
very  strongly  to  the  potential  detriment  of  further  development  of  domestic  capital 
markets  and  it  remains  the  case  that  with  banks'  and  other  market  players'  attention 
focused on the trading of gilt-edged government debt instruments, incentives to develop 
private  debt  markets  --  including  the  interbank  market  --  are  blunted.  The  more  the 
authorities can ease back from bond sterilization -- in a manner that does not jeopardize 
macroeconomic stability -- the more banks will need to actively compete for the smaller 
stock public debt and the greater the incentives for them to further extend lending to the  
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private sector.  By the same token, the less dominant is the short-run treasury bill market, 
the stronger the  incentives  for broader capital  market  innovation and development to 
emerge. 
 
It is important to stress that these considerations operate at the margin and emerge from a 
particular  set  of  circumstances  that  result  in  positive,  anticipated,  shifts  in  money 
demand: they do not imply that there is no role for bond sterilization in monetary policy 
in Uganda in general.  Tradable public debt instruments, whether government debt or 
central bank paper, are essential policy instruments for managing the path of liquidity.  
Given the multiple short-run objectives of the Bank (which include minimizing short-run 
exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  volatility),  multiple  market-based  instruments  are 
invaluable, particularly if the focus is on short-run liquidity management. 
 
Fiscal deficits and domestic debt  
 
This still leaves the question of whether the overall fiscal stance in Uganda means that a 
continued  net  issuance  of  domestic  debt  is  'almost  unavoidable',  as  implied  in  the 
MFPED 'Debt Strategy' (2007) states?  To address this question we must be clear about 
the context.  Two polar cases highlight the issues at stake. 
 
The first case, which has not been the prevailing circumstance in Uganda over recent 
years, but as the global recession bites may well become so in the short- to medium-term, 
is the textbook one of the relationship  between the  fiscal  stance  and  macroeconomic 
stability.  The relevant decisions here for the monetary authorities are first, whether the 
overall deficit after aid and other foreign financing is compatible with macroeconomic 
stability and second, how domestic financing should be balanced between conventional 
domestic borrowing and seigniorage (i.e. the growth in reserve money).  The latter will 
be determined by the indicative inflation target, the demand for reserve money, and the 
expected growth in the real economy (see notes to Table 1). 
 
The issues in this case are well-known and do not need to be reviewed in detail here.  The 
simple conditions for debt dynamics highlight the key elements.  Taking the medium-
term real interest rate and growth rate as given and, for simplicity, assuming that external 
financing of government is all in the form of grants and is exogenous, the inter-temporal 
budget  constraint  of  government  allows  us  to  define  the  debt-solvency/sustainability 
condition as 
 
(13)       
 
where d denotes the debt stock, m  the stock of reserve money, and ps  the primary 
surplus (after aid), all expressed as a percentage of GDP. The real interest rate on debt is 
denoted  as,  r    while  g  denotes  the  growth  rate  of  GDP  and  π  the  rate  of  inflation. 
Equation (13) simply states that sustainability requires that the current stock of debt must  
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be less than or equal to the present discounted value of the stream of future primary 
surpluses plus seigniorage revenue.
25  
Imposing the equality on (13) we get the condition for the stabilization of the public debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
(14)       
 
Notice that the adjusted primary surplus plus real seigniorage can be less than the real 
interest on the debt stock    when the economy is growing and vice versa:  the higher is 
growth the lower the required primary surplus (plus seigniorage).   It also follows, of 
course, that if g>r, or if seigniorage is high the stabilizing fiscal stance may be consistent 
with an adjusted primary deficit.  If the left side of (14) exceeds the right hand side the 
debt stock declines (as a share of GDP) and vice versa.  Hence we can describes the 
dynamics of debt as:
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(15)       
 
Two issues are relevant here.  The first is a rising debt ratio does not mean government is 
insolvent.  Since the solvency condition (13) is defined in terms of the future stream of 
adjusted  public  surpluses  plus  seigniorage,  public  debt  can  rise  without  threatening 
solvency  as  long  as  creditors  expect  the  government  to  make  the  necessary  fiscal 
adjustment at some point in the future to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 
The second is the relationship between monetary and debt policy and concerns the so-
called 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic'.  Attempts to reduce inflation by reducing the 
growth of the money supply require a corresponding fiscal adjustment to ensure the debt 
stock is stabilized. Thus from equation (15), a reduction in  , other things equal will 
entail  , unless there is an equivalent increase in ps .  
 
To  summarize,  in  the  case  of  the  conventional  deficit  financing  problem,  the  inter-
temporal  budget  constraint  dictates  the  feasible  trade-offs  between  debt,  the  primary 
fiscal stance (net of aid flows) and the inflation target.  Thus, for given fundamentals (i.e. 
the growth rate, the real interest rate and the demand for reserve money) and a given 
inflation target, rising domestic debt in inevitable unless and until an appropriate level of 
the fiscal surplus net of aid is established.  Stabilizing debt without a fiscal adjustment 
                                                 
25   The primary surplus in this instance is total revenue including grants less total government non-interest 
expenditure.  Seigniorage consists of two elements, an 'inflation tax' term (the first term in the bracket) and 
a 'real balances' term. 
26 Letting   be the value of debt consistent with  given the fiscal stance, we have three simple 
cases: (i)  .Here the sum of the adjusted primary surplus and seigniorage is just 
sufficient to stabilize the debt stock; (ii) . The fiscal stance is sufficiently tight that the 
debt stock is falling (as a share of GDP); (iii) . The fiscal stance is too loose to stop 








The second case -- where aid flows more than cover the domestic deficit, as has been the 
case in Uganda since the early 2000s -- is much less an issue about government funding 
and more about spending and absorption and reflects a deeper tension in the making of 
macroeconomic policy in a high-aid environment.
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At the risk of over-simplifying the issues, we start with the observation that if indeed aid 
flows fully fund the budget, then there should be no need for domestic debt financing.  If 
so, why is domestic debt rising and why is it such a policy concern? One answer is that, 
in fact, aid is not funding the deficit because the aid inflow is not being absorbed through 
the current account!  Rather, because of concerns about exchange rate appreciation, the 
aid  inflow  is  being  saved  (in  the  form  of  higher  reserves).    The  result  is  that  the 
supposedly 'aid funded' increase in spending is, in fact, a domestic spending increase.  
And since the aid is not being absorbed, this spending is, by default, being financed by 
domestic resources, either debt or inflation: in other words the relevant lens through this 
case is the conventional deficit financing problem discussed in the first case with the one 
difference that official reserves are simultaneously being accumulated (see IMF (2007). 
 
Seen in this light, the question about the 'unavoidable' growth in debt emerges directly 
from  an  unresolved  tension  about  the  scale  of  fiscal  operations  in  the  current 
environment.  Put starkly, there is a tension between, on the one hand, the central bank 
that  sees  enhanced  public  spending  as  having  limited  supply-side  effects  so  that  the 
demand-side spending effects dominate and inevitably lead to upward pressure on the 
real exchange rate to the detriment of the tradable export sector and, on the other, the 
government that either believes the supply-side effects of the aid flow will be sufficiently 
strong to ensure that the real exchange rate appreciation will be short-lived or otherwise 
warranted by productivity gains, or that the  loss of competitiveness  is  a  'price worth 
paying' for the broader social and political benefits deriving from the aid inflow.  Since 
these two views are not fully reconciled, we observe the problem of an economy with an 
apparently strong fiscal position but with high and rising debt. 
 
Coherence in the conduct of monetary policy, and hence the role of domestic debt, lies in 
the  resolution  of  the  underlying  tension.    Either  government  has  to  scale  back  aid 
financed expenditure or the central bank must permit higher absorption by letting the real 
exchange rate adjust fully. Failure to do so raises the risk that the government's pressure 
to spend out of aid and the central banks reluctance to absorb the aid through a widening 
                                                 
27   This assumes that the economy remains on the 'good side' of the inflation laffer curve so that rising 
inflation (i.e. a higher growth in the money supply) generates more seigniorage revenue.  Clearly, as is well 
know from the history of inflation in Uganda, there comes a point where higher inflation reduces 
seigniorage revenue.  In practice, however, this rate is far in excess of any plausible or tolerable inflation 
target. 
28  By 'spending' we mean the increase in the fiscal deficit before aid -- aid that is fully spent entails the 
fiscal deficit before aid increases by the full amount of the aid inflow -- and by 'absorption' we mean the 
increase in the current account deficit before aid.  From the perspective of the resource transfer perspective 
on aid, full absorption is required to fully transfer the aid to the recipient economy.  
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of the current account / appreciation of the real exchange rate, can only be resolved by 
higher growth in domestic debt or a relaxation of the inflation target.
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This adjustment probably cannot happen instantly, nor, as the discussion of the reserve 
buffer indicated, does the logic imply a slavish adherence to the extreme case of 'full and 
continuous spending and full and continuous absorption (i.e. a pure float)'.  The point is 
to lay bear the logic:  the problems in monetary policy in Uganda are as much to do with 
the coordination of  fiscal and  monetary policy  and  expectations as they are with the 
mechanics of monetary policy alone. 
 
4.  IS THERE A CASE FOR CAPITAL CONTROLS? 
The dominant theme of this paper has been the challenge that official and private capital 
flows present to the conduct of monetary policy.  The surge in private capital flows in 
mid-2007 is only the most dramatic episode of private capital inflows.  In that instance, 
the Bank of Uganda’s response was timely and adroit.  Nonetheless such flows represent 
a potential source of instability in the nominal exchange rate and/or monetary policy by 
generating potentially large changes in liquidity conditions, in both directions.  A natural 
question is then whether there is a case for imposing controls, specifically on short-run 
speculative flows. 
 
Conventional wisdom in the academic literature, including from the IMF, cautions rapid 
capital account liberalization (see for example, Prasad and Rajan, 2008).  This caution 
reflects  a  concern  about  the  capacity  of  countries  with  relatively  underdeveloped 
financial  sectors to  successfully  manage  the  volatility  associated  with  foreign  capital 
inflows.  Nominal and real exchange rate volatility becomes a serious challenge while 
recent  empirical  evidence  offers  a  more  skeptical  assessment  of  the  empirical  links 
between  capital  flows  and  growth.    While  capital  flows  clearly  can  support  higher 
investment and growth, these effects are probably weaker and less direct than previously 
thought, particularly when financial sectors are small or under-developed.  Weaker in the 
sense that under-developed financial systems are more likely to channel foreign capital to 
easily collateralized non-tradeable investments like real estate, thereby contributing to 
asset price booms than into investments underpinning long-run growth.  Less direct in the 
sense  that  many  of  the  benefits  operate  through  the  effect  of  capital  flows  on  the 
development of the financial sector itself. 
 
While  this  evidence  supports  the  case  for  moving  cautiously  on  capital  account 
liberalization it says little about what to do if the capital account has already been opened, 
at  least  de  jure.    Many  have  made  the  point  that  in  these  circumstances,  it  may  be 
extremely difficult, or at least very costly, to 'put the genie back in the bottle'.  It is clearly 
                                                 
29   This is an intentionally stylized representation of the problem.  The point is, however, to clarify the 
essential logic of the two cases and to illustrate the circumstances in which domestic debt accumulation is 
or is not 'unavoidable'.  More detailed discussion of these cases, including a more subtle treatment of the 
problem when government face credibility problems, can be found in IMF (2007), Adam et al (2008) and 
Buffie et al (2009).  
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not impossible, but the challenge facing any regime considering some form of tax or 
other  'friction'  on  short-run  capital  flows  is  to  ensure  that  such  a  move  does  not 
undermine the authorities' credibility in general or otherwise adversely affect the flow of 
medium  and  long-term  capital  to  the  economy.    The  experience  of  other  countries 
attempting to limit short-run flows is mixed. 
 
The  best  known  case  is  Chile  which  imposed  taxes  in  the  form  of  ‘un-remunerated’ 
reserve requirements, on short-term debt  inflows  in 1991.  Over time, the authorities 
established ‘minimum stay’ requirements on capital flows so that the withholding tax is 
waived if capital inflows endure for more than one year.  Chilean authors argue that 
measures did not influence the volume of capital flows but tilted their maturity structure 
in  favour of  longer-dated capital  flows.   The experience of other countries,  many of 
which sought to tax outflows rather than inflows is less positive.  Malaysia’s attempts to 
tax outflows in the wake of the East Asian crisis were deemed unsuccessful while those 
imposed more recently by India and Thailand were quickly circumvented, suggesting that 




Prasad and Rajan (2008) draw a number of lessons which are relevant for Uganda.  The 
first is that it may be easier to tax inflows (at a very modest rate) than outflows. Second, 
taxes may serve to best to tilt the maturity of capital flows rather than alter the volume. 
But finally, taxation of capital flows requires the capacity of the authorities to accurately 
identify and track flows through the financial system.  Perceptions that capital taxation is 
capricious or that tax instruments will be applied in a manner that lacks transparency or 
systematically discriminate in favour of certain investors or investments can only serve to 
undermine the credibility of the authorities and thus raise the risk that policy in this area 




Three  key  issues  should  be  addressed  by  the  authorities  as  they  consider  whether  to 
introduce some form of taxation on short-run capital flows.  The first requirement is, 
clearly,  a  credible  and  robust  tracking  and  monitoring  system  for  capital  account 
transactions.  This is a major undertaking, particularly if the objective is to target some 
capital account flows and not others.  Some capital flows, such as official aid flows and 
transactions through the formal banking system can be monitored relatively easily.  The 
problem for countries such as Uganda is that the informal capital account is large.  In the 
past this reflected, amongst other things, the effect of a dual exchange rate system which 
imposed a punitive 'tax' on capital inflows coming though official channels.  But the 
bigger problem is that even in the absence of exchange rate distortions, a large proportion 
of  capital  flows  are  informal  household-to-household  remittances  or  represent  the 
counterparty capital account transactions associated with illegal cross-border trade. 
                                                 
30  Both Thailand (Dec 2006) and India (May – August 2007) attempted to impose controls.  In Thailand, 
the government announced a 15 percent withholding tax on short-run inflows, prompting a massive sell-off 
in the equity market and withdrawal of the tax.  In India, the authorities  sought to limit external 




A large portion of these capital flows are intermediated through the 'formal' economy 
through changes in the stock of on-shore foreign currency deposits held with the banking 
system.  But movements in foreign currency accounts will also reflect changes arising 
from capital account flows that one may wish to exempt from taxation (e.g. long-term 
flows or those associated with FDI) and current account transactions (changes in working 
capital balances, for example). Any monitoring system put in place must have sufficient 
discriminatory power to ensure that the proposed capital taxation process is appropriately 
targeted.  This means avoiding the extremes of tax system ending up taxing all foreign 
currency transactions or taxing only a narrow class of transactions on account of their 
'visibility' rather than because they are the transactions that the authorities actively seek to 
discourage.  Having raised these concerns, it is worth underlying that investing resources 
to  improve  the  monitoring  of  capital  account  transactions  is  desirable  regardless  of 
whether the authorities seek to tax capital account transactions. 
 
The second consideration is more conceptual and concerns the anticipated elasticity of 
portfolio flows with respect to the rate of capital taxation.  Given the structure of the 
Ugandan economy and, in particular, the thinness of domestic asset market, it is possible 
that this elasticity is very low.  Evidence from a range of small low-income economies in 
recent  years  suggest  that  potentially  de-stabilizing  capital  inflows  are  relatively  rare 
events  and  tend  to  reflect  emerging  (or  anticipated)  large  interest  rate  misalignments 
between Ugandan and international capital market conditions. Relying on tax instruments 
to close off these channels raises the risk that the ex ante rate of taxation might need to be 
set at a high level to discourage those capital flows that the authorities most fear. 
 
This reflects the third consideration, namely the extent to which capital controls or capital 
taxation represents a response to the symptom rather than the cause.  Given the structure 
of the Ugandan economy and, possibly, the conduct of macroeconomic policy, interest 
rate volatility and induced speculative capital inflows will remain a persistent feature of 
the economy.  This may suggest that the first-best response to the problem of speculative 
flows lies in the broader conduct of fiscal and monetary policy rather than with capital 
taxation. 
 
Having said this, and recognizing the tracking and monitoring problems discussed earlier, 
there may still be a case for further examining options for taxing short-run capital flow, 
but  as  one  component  of  a  policy  package  aimed  at  developing  and  deepening  the 
financial  sector  as  a  whole  rather  than  as  a  reaction  of  a  specific  macroeconomic 
problem. 
 
5.  TRANSITION TO INFLATION TARGETING 
In the  background of all  contemporary discussions on  monetary policy  in  Uganda  at 
present is the question of whether the authorities should adopt a formal inflation targeting 
(IT) framework and if so how quickly should it aim to do so.  A related question is 
whether the process of establishing a new monetary anchor puts the current operating 
regime at risk.  If it does, the question of timing becomes contingent: presumably any 
such transition  should take advantage of  favourable  macroeconomic conditions.  What  
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might these be?  This section briefly outlines the basic tenets of an IT framework and 
quickly summarizes some of the evidence adduced in support of this approach.  We then 
turn to some major challenges that adoption of a full-fledged IT regime entails. 
 
The starting point for this discussion is the challenge facing all monetary regimes, namely 
how  to  reconcile  the  essential  tension  between  rules  and  discretion  at  the  heart  of 
monetary  policy.    The  prevailing  intellectual  consensus  stresses  the  benefits  of 
maintaining a rule-based approach to hitting a target for inflation on the grounds that 
rules are best placed to minimize or eliminate the incentives of the monetary authorities 
to operate in a time-inconsistent manner.
31 A reserve money programme is one such rule-
based approach.  But inflexible adherence to rules can be costly in terms of meeting the 
second  objective  of  monetary  policy  namely  the  discretionary  employment  of  the 
instruments of monetary policy in judicious manner to tighten or loosen credit conditions 
so as to smooth excess movements in relative prices and thus moderate fluctuations in the 
path of domestic output relative to its trend rate of growth.  Even when functioning well, 
reserve money targeting fulfils this second objective rather poorly.
32  Inflation targeting 




Virtually all contemporary monetary regimes, including Uganda’s current reserve money 
programme, can be thought of as ‘inflation targeting’ regimes in the strict sense that a 
central objective -- if not the dominant objective – of monetary policy is to establish a 
credible anchor for domestic prices.  The choice of anchor is not an un-constrained one, 
however; rather it has implications for how the authorities address the other concerns 
competing for their attention.  The fundamental nature of the constraint is encapsulated 
by the notion of the ‘impossible trinity’ or the ‘trilemma’ which states that beyond the 
short-run  no country can simultaneously  maintain  an open capital account, target the 
exchange rate and pursue an independent monetary policy.
33 One of the three must be 
                                                 
31  The notion of time-inconsistency of monetary policy dates back to the Nobel-prize winning work of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and was developed in the context on monetary policy by Barro and Gordon 
(1983).  The essential idea is that when the authorities set their policy instrument once the private sector has 
formed its expectations about inflation (possibly based on some prior announcement about the stance of 
policy) the authorities will have an incentive to renege on their announcement.  Specifically, a monetary 
authority concerned about output as well as inflation will have an incentive to announce a commitment to 
low inflation and then renege on this commitment to exploit the short-run Phillips curve so as to boost 
aggregate demand. Anticipating this incentive, however, the initial policy announcement will not be 
credible and private sector expectations will adjust accordingly.  In this situation, to make their 
announcements credible, the monetary authorities may want to make a commitment to a fixed policy rule. 
32  In reality, reserve money programmes have tended to be employed in circumstances where initially the 
weight placed on inflation control was so large that relatively poor performance in terms of output or 
consumption smoothing was tolerated.  This was certainly the case in Uganda in the early 1990s. 
33 To illustrate, consider the case of a positive external shock which raises the ex ante return to domestic 
bonds.  With an open capital account private capital will flow in to eliminate the cross-border return 
differential, thereby generating an incipient appreciation of the currency. Attempts to stabilize the exchange 
rate will draw the central bank into foreign exchange intervention, thereby undermining the autonomy of 
domestic monetary policy through the effect of intervention on the domestic money stock.   Restoring 
monetary autonomy through bond sterilization may work but only by driving up domestic interest rates  
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abandoned even though each of these objectives are desirable in their own right: open 
capital accounts to the extent they support the efficient global allocation of capital to 
high-return investment opportunities; exchange rate targeting to support trade and sustain 
a stable external value of the currency; and domestic monetary policy to pursue domestic 
output stabilization objectives. 
 
For much of post-independence era, Uganda reconciled the trilemma through controls on 
capital  flows  (and,  for  some  periods,  on  current  account  flows  as  well).    Moreover, 
despite the liberalization of capital account transactions from the mid-1990s onwards, the 
economy appears to have continued to successfully dodge the bullet of the trilemma, 
intervening aggressively in foreign exchange markets from time to time while at the same 
time  using  domestic  monetary  policy  (by  manipulating  interest  rates  or  the  money 
supply) to attempt to influence the path of reserve money and aggregate demand.  This 
appears to have been possible because while capital account restrictions have been lifted 
de jure, the response of private capital has been slow, whether for reasons of risk and 
uncertainty or ignorance.  Since the early 2000s, however, as returns have fallen, risk 
premia become compressed and private capital has sought out ever more exotic markets, 
the volume of private return-sensitive portfolio capital flows has grown dramatically and 
the authorities have been confronted for the first time by the full force of the trilemma. 
 
Although debate continues on the case for policy measures to limit short-run cross-border 
capital flows either through tax or other restrictions (see above) it is reasonable to expect 
that  capital  flows  have  become  permanently  more  responsive  to  cross-border  return 
differentials, even in the presence of tax distortions.  Hence for Uganda, the resolution of 
the trilemma has become a simple choice over the nominal anchor for inflation. 
 
IT  regimes  seek  to  anchor  inflation  by  controlling  expected  inflation.    Thus,  the 
instruments at the disposal of the central bank, be they price or quantity instruments, are 
set so as to influence the private sector’s expected or forecast rate of inflation at some 
horizon. This future expected inflation rate will, according to the argument, feed into 
current price and wage setting behaviour, thereby validating the forecast and placing the 
economy on an expectations-consistent path.  The essential feature of the regime is a 
framework  within  which  the  authorities’  policy  actions  and  announcements  credibly 
influence the evolution of the private sector’s inflation expectations.  Two elements are 
critical. 
 
The first is a public commitment to an explicit target for the inflation rate, defined either 
as a point or interval target.  This commitment may also include a horizon over which the 
target should be hit, thereby determining how quickly deviations from target should be 
corrected.  The target, typically set by government, may be defined either in terms of 
overall , ‘headline’, inflation or ‘core’ inflation, where the latter excludes specific items 
such as food and fuel whose prices are determined principally by supply-side effects or 
                                                                                                                                            
relative to world rates, thereby exacerbating the original pressure on the exchange rate.  Eventually one of 
the objectives must be abandoned.  
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world  market  conditions  and  to  which  it  will  generally  be  more  appropriate  to 
accommodate rather than attempt to offset.
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The second element is a structured approach to deliberation and communication on the 
part  of  the  central  bank.    The  objective  is  to  resolve  the  problems  of  asymmetric 
information which can create incentives for time-inconsistent behaviour on the part of the 
monetary authorities.  Making public, in a timely fashion, the central bank’s information 
and its analysis thereof ensures its actions are verifiable and sufficiently informative to 
reveal its own expectations of future developments and the relative weight it places on 
other objectives such as output gap or, more likely, the exchange rate.  The objective is to 
demonstrate credibly that the authorities do not have private information about economic 
conditions that they can exploit in a time-inconsistent manner. 
 
In practice this means that IT central banks publish voting records of the members of 
interest-rate setting committees; they publish in some form the evidence and economic 
analysis that informs these rate-setting decisions; and they devote substantial resources to 
public information and direct engagement with key stakeholders.  It also usually means 
bringing independent external members into key decision-making bodies.
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This comprehensive communication strategy applies both when inflation is on target and, 
a fortiori, when it is off-target, in which case additional disclosure requirements may be 
placed on the central bank to explain deviations and specify remedial action to return 
inflation to target. The Bank of England’s ‘Open Letter to the Chancellor’ (Minister for 
Finance) is perhaps the best-known example of this approach.  Important elements in 
establishing  the  credibility  of  this  structure  are  the  reliance  on  independent  external 
membership of key decision-making bodies -- the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee being a good example – and the pressures these bodies exert on the national 
statistics offices to produce timely and accurate data. 
 
These  two  features,  referred  to  as  ‘constrained  discretion’,  describe  how  IT  regimes 
resolve the rules versus discretion tension.  The explicit inflation target, along with the 
associated  components  of  public  disclosure  and  explanation  of  policy  decisions  and 
outcomes, provides the credible constraint, the belief in the private sector’s mind that the 
central bank will (eventually) bring inflation back on track and will do so in a transparent 
manner.    To  the  extent  that  these  structures  defuse  the  time-inconsistency  problem 
inherent in monetary policy, they serve to reduce the correlation between expected future 
inflation, upon which current wage- and price-setting is based, and current prices tends 
                                                 
34  The role of monetary policy is to use policy instruments so as to place ‘sticky’ prices as close to their 
notional ‘flex-price’ equilibrium values as possible.  By this argument, prices that are in fact fully flexible, 
such as imports where variations in world prices are allowed to pass through instantly to domestic prices, 
should be excluded from the target. Failure to exclude them would lead to placing excess weight on the 
policy levers.  For example, seeking to lean against a positive oil price shock – which would be the case if 
policy was geared to targeting headline inflation - would lead to an inefficiently tight squeeze on the non-
oil price component of the headline index. 
35  Members of the Bank of England MPC have also stressed the importance of developing, and developing 
early, a ‘culture of intellectual dissent’ in which the central bank governor and his or her executive can find 
themselves in a minority on interest rate decisions, especially when such voting records are made public.  
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towards.  In other words, the private sector is able to ‘see through’ temporary inflation 





The  recent  literature  on  inflation  targeting  paints  a  powerful  empirical  case  for  the 
success of IT regimes -- at least for the period up to 2007.  Countries adopting IT have 
generally posted significant gains in terms of credibility and, as a result, in meeting the 
two  principal  objectives  of  low  and  stable  inflation  and  better  output  stabilization.  
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) summarize the results for IT regimes as follows. 
 
•  First, countries with IT regimes tend to be associated with lower inflation and lower 
inflation volatility, both with respect to their own history and with respect to most 
non-IT countries.  The exceptions are the mature ‘eclectic’ non-IT regimes such as 
the European Central  Bank and the US  Federal Reserve  Board, where significant 
differences in relative performance are difficult to discern. 
 
•  Second, IT regimes are associated with lower output volatility, again relative to their 
own history and to non IT countries.  Critically, this reduction in output volatility is 
observed to occur simultaneously with the reduction in inflation volatility. In other 
words, the evidence suggests that IT regimes are not simply reflecting a preference 
for  lower  inflation  (and  inflation  volatility)  over  output  volatility  but  rather these 
regimes have been able to gain on both fronts, unambiguously increasing welfare. 
 
•  Third,  evidence  from  surveys  of  inflation  expectations  amongst  decision  makers, 
from  bond  market  data  and  from  elsewhere  suggests  that  in  IT  regimes  inflation 
expectations have fallen, often quite rapidly, within target zones upon adoption of 
explicit inflation targets and that deviations of actual inflation from target are quite 
quickly  corrected  (Mishkin  and  Schmidt-Hebbel,  2007  and  Aron  and  Muellbauer, 
2007).    Moreover,  the  correlation  between  expected  future  inflation,  upon  which 
current wage- and price-setting is based, and current prices has fallen in IT countries 
(Woodford,  2007).    In  other  words,  inflation  expectations  are  becoming  more 
securely  anchored  on  their  target  values  and  hence  less  sensitive  to  current 
inflationary developments; the private sector appears to be better able to ‘see through’ 
temporary inflation deviations in their wage and price setting decisions. 
 
This is compelling evidence, all the more so because much of the research on which it is 
based exploits  best-practice econometric  methods and,  by drawing on the burgeoning 
literature on  programme  evaluation,  attempts  to  address  the  fundamental  endogeneity 
associated with the choice of monetary regime.  Nonetheless it must be qualified.  
 
First,  the  sample  of  IT-adopting  countries  remains  small  with  little  more  than  20 
countries  worldwide  pursuing  full-fledged  IT  regimes.    Working  with  such  a  small 
sample means researchers cannot completely control for problems of sample selection 
and aggregation.  Countries that have adopted IT regimes tend to fall into two groups.   
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The first are those with robust institutional frameworks for whom the move toward IT 
was,  at  least  in  retrospect,  a  natural  technical  innovation  in  response  to  changing 
structural features in the domestic economy.  Into this category might fall countries such 
as the UK, New Zealand and Canada: this group may be usefully identified by the often 
repeated claim of a former Bank of Canada governor that “we did not abandon monetary 
targets, they abandoned us!”  These are countries where the much-vaunted feature of the 
regime, namely ‘credibility’ was, at least to a substantial degree, in place.  The second 
group are those countries such as Israel, which adopted IT out of desperation as part of a 
price stabilization challenge, often after all other options had failed but also when the 
political commitment to adhere to the discipline of any regime had finally been wrought.  
Aggregating these two groups of countries, and their very different outcomes, generates 
an ‘average treatment effect’ that is remarkably hard to interpret. 
 
A second important consideration is the global background to the IT experiment.  The 
introduction  of  IT  regimes  coincided  with  the  ‘great  moderation’  in  inflation  where, 
broadly speaking, China and the other large emerging economies were net contributors to 
global  aggregate  supply.    Since  late  2006  global  economic  conditions  have  changed; 
inflation has risen sharply across the world as these same emerging markets have sharply 
added to global aggregate demand.  It is too early to tell whether the IT regimes will 
continue to out-perform the control group in this changed global environment, or indeed 
how well IT regimes perform in bringing inflation expectations back to target. 
 
The  predictable  if  rather  negative  conclusion  emerging  from  this  brief  review  of  the 
evidence is that it is enormously difficult to draw definitive lessons from the evidence.  
Superficially the evidence on inflation targeting is persuasive and it is notable that no 
country IT has either stepped back from the regime.  Nonetheless, as we have noted, the 
evidence  needs  to  be  interpreted  with  caution  and  from  a  position  which  pays  due 
attention to country-specific characteristics.  It is to these issues we now turn. 
 
Key Transitional Issues 
 
This text-book description of the full-fledged IT regime sets the bar high and in practice 
only  a  few  countries  demonstrate  all  these  characteristics.  Many  countries,  including 
Uganda, may be classified as pursuing ‘Inflation Targeting lite’ regimes (Stone, 2003) 
which describes countries whose  monetary  frameworks are gravitating towards an IT 
configuration but where operationally the conduct of monetary policy lacks some clarity 
of objectives and transparency of communication.  Thus while most ITL regimes tend to 
announce a target for inflation and, simultaneously, commit to a flexible exchange rate, 
the clear and verifiable prioritization of objectives may still be lacking. In many cases 
this lack of clarity is located in the trilemma; many ITL regimes are characterized by a 
strong tendency for exchange rate management so that the prioritization of the competing 
constraints of independent monetary policy and the desire to influence the path of the 
exchange rate is obscure.  Moreover, structures for communication and verification are 
only beginning to be established; central bank balance sheets are often still too weak to 
allow  effective  deployment  of  policy  instruments  and,  in  some  cases,  core  analytical  
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capacity  –  in  inflation  forecasting  and  developing  robust  models  of  the  transmission 
mechanism, for example – are only just being built. 
 
Successful transition towards a full-fledged inflation targeting regime that is relevant to 
Uganda requires progress across three major fronts. These are briefly introduced in the 
remainder  of  this  section.  As  mentioned  above,  these  concerns  are  not  exclusive  to 
developing  an  inflation targeting regime; they  are equally  valuable  in the conduct of 
monetary policy under the current reserve money programme. 
 
Managing Fiscal Dominance 
 
Fiscal dominance is the single greatest threat to the smooth functioning of any monetary 
framework, including an IT regime.  Fiscal dominance may be defined as a situation in 
which the government adopts a fiscal stance that is incompatible with sustaining low 
inflation without recourse to distortionary measures such as heavy taxation of financial 
intermediation through reserve requirements or more draconian restrictions such as those 
underpinning the  multiple exchange rate regimes prevalent throughout the 1980s.  In 
circumstance of extreme fiscal dominance, the actions of the central banks become fully 
subsumed to the over-riding requirement of funding fiscal deficits, so that the central 
bank loses control over the size and composition of its balance sheet.  Its capacity to 
separate  liquidity  management  objectives  from  its  government  funding  obligations 
eliminates its capacity to conduct monetary policy beyond the very short run. 
 
As noted in the introduction, Uganda’s recent macroeconomic success owes much to the 
tight  fiscal  control  exerted  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Development 
through the  institution of the cash  budget.  The contribution of  fiscal control to past 
successes cannot be understated, but  what matters from a monetary policy perspective is 
not just the ex post fiscal outcome but also the risk that fiscal dominance problems might 
re-emerge  and,  in  particular,  the  private  sector’s  expectations  concerning  the  fiscal 
authorities willingness, or capacity, to resist such pressures. 
 
This is a challenge for all countries but is particularly relevant in developing countries 
where the fiscal stance tends to be strongly pro-cyclical and where fiscal consolidations 
are hard to sustain.
36  Arguably these problem are magnified in resource-rich economies -
- such as Uganda hopes to become --  where the interaction of ‘voracity effects’ arising 
from highly visible fiscal booms makes spending increases harder to resist during booms 
and spending cuts harder to push through during recessions.  If access to world capital 
markets  is  similarly  pro-cyclical,  latent  fiscal  pressures  will  manifest  themselves  as 
pressures for domestic deficit financing.  When domestic debt markets are also thin the 
domestic debt burden can rise rapidly in response to borrowing pressures, which may 
raise incentives for the fiscal authorities to seek recourse to (surprise) inflation to reduce 
the real debt stock. 
 
These  risks  raise  a  set  of  questions  about  the  flexibility  and  credibility  of  fiscal 
institutions and whether the design of effective monetary frameworks necessarily requires 




the  establishment  of  compatible  fiscal  rules,  beyond  the  current  cash  budget.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that, beyond the flexibility delivered through automatic 
fiscal stabilizers, fiscal policy – and hence fiscal policy rules -- should be trained on 
issues  of  longer  term  debt  sustainability,  with  short  term  stabilization  being  left  to 
monetary policy, where variations in the fiscal stance feed into the output gap to which 





Communication and coherence  
 
The second key challenge concerns developing robust institutions to coordinate fiscal and 
monetary policies and to sustain a coherent communication strategy.  The legacy of the 
cash budget and the history of close cooperation between the Bank of Uganda and the 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Development,  centred  on  the  development  and 
implementation of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, are clearly advantageous 
in this respect. Where further investment is required, is in building the Bank of Uganda’s 
infrastructure  for the  effective  communication  with  the  private  sector  along  the  lines 
discussed above. 
 
Understanding the monetary transmission mechanism 
 
The effectiveness of monetary policy, and the credibility of any regime will depend on 
how reliably and how quickly observable policy actions influence inflation and other real 
variables.  In  other  words,  effectiveness  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  transmission 
mechanism  and,  critically,  on  how  well  it  is  understood  since  the  credibility  of  the 
monetary  regime  will  be  undermined  if  observed  policy  actions  are  perceived  to  be 
ineffective or even have persistently perverse outcomes. 
 
The textbook macroeconomic  model,  which underpins  both IT  frameworks and, with 
little  modification,  the  more  conventional  monetary  frameworks  employed  in  Africa, 
fundamentally derives from research and experience of OECD economies such as the 
UK, New Zealand and Canada and mature emerging market economies such as Chile.
37  
This model embodies a particular characterization of the transmission mechanism which 
tends  to  emphasise  the  conventional  interest  rate  channels  of  transmission,  in  which 
short-run  interest rate decisions  are transmitted through a well-defined  yield  curve to 
long-term interest rates which, in turn, given inflation expectations, influence the interest-
sensitive  components  of  aggregate  demand  and  hence  moderate  expected  and  actual 
inflation.   In the open economy setting, where capital account openness is presumed, this 
                                                 
37  Labeled the ‘New Keynesian Open-Economy Model, this model consists of four basic elements: (i) an 
open economy IS curve characterizing aggregate demand in which the output gap responds to movements 
in real interest rates and real exchange rate; (ii) on the supply-side a Phillips curve in which the 
conventional inflation-output relationship is augmented by a pass-through effect from the exchange rate; 
(iii) an interest parity condition; and (iv) a policy rule summarizing central bank interest rate-setting 
behaviour (Berg et al, 2006).  As Adam et al (2008) note, this model can be readily adapted to reflect an 
environment in which the policy instrument is the money supply rather than the interest rate.  
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effect is augmented by the exchange rate channel.  Working through the interest parity 
conditions, higher interest rates appreciate the exchange rate which reduces net exports 
and thus the output gap.  In addition, the exchange rate appreciation reduces the domestic 
cost of imports. 
 
In  Uganda,  where  the  financial  sector  is  much  less  developed  these  traditional 
transmission channels  may  be  less powerful, while others  may  dominate.  Moreover, 
transmission effects are also likely to be much less stable.  The processes of structural 
transformation and innovation in financial markets noted above have generated shocks to 
velocity and the money multipliers and are likely to have substantially altered the short-
to-medium-run  link  between  money  growth  or  nominal  depreciation  and  domestic 
inflation and output. In the rest of this section, we consider some of the areas where the 
transmission mechanism in Uganda is likely to differ from the textbook characterization. 
 
The interest rate channel 
In  industrial  countries,  short-term  market  interest  rates  are  the  main  instrument  of 
monetary policy, operating directly through interest-sensitive components of absorption 
and  indirectly  through  wealth  effects,  by  altering  collateral  conditions  and  thereby 
expanding  or  contracting  bank  lending.    An  implicit  assumption  is  that  the  banking 
system is relatively competitive and fully lent out so that changes in the short-run policy 
rate are rapidly transmitted through the length of the yield curve.  In Uganda, where 
monetary  policy  tends  to  be  exercised  through  operations  on  the  central  bank’s  own 
balance sheet – via open market operations and foreign exchange sales – and where the 
banking sector is relatively oligopolistic the classical interest rate channel is less likely to 
be so important.  
 
Credit channel 
Nonetheless, monetary policy can alter the level of credit available to loan-dependent 
borrowers and affect real activity via the ‘effective’ cost of capital even when interest 
rates  do  not  constitute  an  instrument  of  monetary  policy.  In  the  presence  of  credit 
rationing, a monetary policy that increases the loanable resources available to banks may 
sharply reduce the shadow cost of capital for rationed borrowers.  Historically, banks in 
Uganda have done rather little intermediation, preferring to invest in liquid government 
securities and non-remunerated excess reserves.  This suggests a historically weak credit 
channel  in  the  transmission  of  monetary  policy.    However,  as  rates  on  government 
securities  have  declined  and  excess  reserve  holdings  reduced,  we  might  expect  this 
channel to strengthen over time. 
 
Exchange rate channel 
Monetary policy operates through asset prices as well as through interest rates, and the 
exchange rate is by far the most important of these in Uganda.  On the current account, 
exchange rate changes influence aggregate demand by generating expenditure-switching 
between  traded  and  non-traded  goods.    Exchange  rate  changes  also  redistribute  real 
income among sector-specific factors of production, making the exchange rate a subject 
of intense political concern to policymakers even if the direct aggregate demand effects 
of the redistribution are small. On the capital account, the same movements create capital  
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gains  or  losses  on  assets  denominated  in  foreign  currency  which,  in  turn,  may  feed 
through wealth effects to consumption.  Although dollar-denominated deposits are widely 
available, commercial banks rarely hold substantial open positions, due to a combination 
of regulatory restrictions and caution;  nor do domestic  firms, given the reluctance of 
banks  to  lend  domestically  in  foreign  currency.    Nonetheless,  the  widespread  use  of 
foreign  currency  and  foreign  currency  deposits  in  private  portfolios  has  at  least  two 
related implications for monetary control. First, the availability of a ready substitute for 
domestic money increases the sensitivity of domestic money demand to interest rates and 
inflation. Other things equal, the response of inflation and capital flows to money supply 
shocks will be quantitatively larger and may be less predictable than in the absence of 
dollarization. Monetary aggregates that do not include foreign currency deposits (e.g., 
domestic  M2)  but  that  are  affected  by  substitution  between  domestic  and  foreign-
currency  denominated  assets  may  perform  poorly  as  indicators  of  inflation  pressure, 
relative either to narrower aggregates less affected by substitution (e.g., the monetary 
base) or to broader aggregates like M3 that include foreign currency deposits (Berg and 
Borensztein, 2000).  Second, by enhancing the substitutability of domestic and foreign 
assets, dollarization heightens the macroeconomic importance of portfolio adjustments, 
both as autonomous shocks and as responses to other shocks. 
 
Fiscal channels 
Finally,  although  conventional  interest  rate  channels  may  not  be  as  powerful  as 
elsewhere,  interest  rate  effects  may  operate  more  powerfully  in  emerging  markets 
through domestic debt  markets onto the  fiscal  accounts  for the reasons we discussed 
above.  Thus central bank open market operations using government debt instruments can 
exert powerful real effects through the fiscal burden of interest payments.  These effects 
may be magnified when the domestic fiscal balance is also sensitive to movements in the 
exchange  rate  as  is  the  case  in  economies  where  revenues  are  highly  dependent  on 
commodity prices and/or aid flows.  These fiscal channels of transmission tend not to 
feature in the textbook model of the transmission mechanism. 
 
Successful monetary policy operations under an IT regime, and in the current reserve 
money / ‘inflation targeting lite’ regime, depends on the central bank developing a clear 
view on the relative strength of these different channels and the speed with which policy 
impulses are transmitted along each.  Knowing this helps define the appropriate choice of 
instrument (even in an IT regime).  The companion paper to this starts to make inroads 
into this issue by building on the recent work by the Bank of Uganda staff and the IMF.
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